The control of all Libyan cities by the country’s Interim Transitional National Council, the death of Qaddafi and the completion of the Libyan revolution has led to heated discussions about the repeat of the Libyan revolution for Iran. I want to look at this possibility in three episodes and see how realistic it is in the near future and the necessary conditions for it.
Every political and social event is unique which happens or takes place under very specific social, historic etc conditions. So in fact an event that takes place in one society and under very specific conditions can never take place identically in another place. But lessons certainly can be drawn from such events which can be applied to situations that have similar circumstances.
So let’s see whether the short-term conditions under which we find Iran today to expect a repeat of the Libyan experience. In other words is this an illusion or a reality.
Examinations reveal that the possibility of Libyaization of Iran is not valid on the basis of objective evidence. There is absolutely no evidence that Iran is on the verge of repeating the Libyan model. But those who view it as a possibility comprise different types. There are those who are concerned that as the Iranian polity shrinks some of the pro-change groups will push events to welcome a repeat of the Libyan experience. The attraction for such passionate individuals outside Iran is Mustafa Abdul Jalil. There are others who have a problem with this approach based on principle. And then there are those who have turned into megalomaniacs because of their dogmatic convictions and ideological opposition. And finally there are those who have political concerns that the end of Qaddafi’s rule over Libya with the military participation of the international community will result in the radicalization of the Iranian political scene which would in turn reduce their political reach, pushing their political policies to the sidelines.
But the fact remains that there are no credible reasons that Iran is on the verge of repeating the Libyan model. None of the outside factors - the US or Europe - have taken the position of repeating the Libyan model in Iran. Government officials and key administration figures in the US and its main decision making bodies are not stressing the need for a military attack on Iran. The policy of the United States on the assassination of the Saudi ambassador plot is to expand the sanctions regime against Iran within the framework of international cooperation from other major powers and the UN. The most anti-Iranian elements in the US have at the most called for dispatching a naval fleet to the Persian Gulf and engaging in naval exercises to threaten the Iranian regime. US government spokesperson and the State Department spokesperson have repeatedly stressed that for now diplomacy and sanctions are the tools against Iran. Even the statements by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to VOA’s Persian Service about the Libyaization of Iran cannot be taken as the position of the whole US government. The record shows that her statements do not necessarily translate into the existence of a specific policy drawn up behind the scenes. She has in fact made some major blunders too. One should also not interpret her words to mean support like in Libya. It appears that she sees the positive view of leaders of a movement for foreign assistance to be the necessary factor in such a US role.
The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and the transfer of some of them to Kuwait at best only indicate the continuation of existing policies and situation in the Persian Gulf, not a new policy.
Senior NATO officials vehemently deny interfering in Syria, let alone Iran which is not even at that stage now and which lack any physical manifestation of protests.
The news reports about a possible military action by Israel still appear to be more like a propaganda and psychological war. The shadow of an Israeli military strike too has been present throughout the period of Iran’s nuclear crisis.
The harshest remarks made in US extreme and peripheral circles have been about assassinating the commanders of the IRGC which have been made by private individuals which lack security or political meaning.
Europe too has not shown any evidence of interest in undertaking a military action or embarking on a no-fly zone policy regarding Iran. Among the Iranian opposition, inside and outside the country too, no group or prominent individual has called for repeating the Libyan model in Iran. One cannot take small talk, passing comments or even wishful thinking as serious political positions.
Efforts by political activists outside Iran to create an all-encompassing opposition group are not something new to be translated into Libyaization of Iran. Such efforts have a history of at least ten years which have till today not materialized. The efforts of today are not based on any new developments either. And in any case they cannot be linked to Libya.
The publication of UN special rapporteur Ahmed Shaheed’s report on human rights in Iran is also no different from similar reports published in the last three decades and also has no elements indicating the Libyaization of Iran. In the developments that have followed the Khordad 2 (pro-reform) movement no such policy has been taken because of human rights reports on Iran.
So this idea of the possibility of using the Libyan model for Iran is a mere exaggeration. Much hue and cry about nothing is the best term one can give to such talk. To make a claim credible, documents and evidence has to be presented, which in this case is lacking.
The second episode deals with the question of whether Libyaization of Iran would even be useful and good for Iran.
It must be noted that the Libya approach was not the first and best choice but was chosen because the alternatives were far worse and catastrophic. It was the bad choices that were available. Iranian society does not face such bad options and there are still many possibilities before it, thus negating the Libyan model for now.
The worse situation is when a despotic regime imposes fear on a society after massive killings. This situation, according to Gandhi, is one of those where violence is preferable. “It is better to be violent, if there is violence in our hearts, than to put on the cloak of nonviolence to cover impotence,” he said.
Today, the main issue before the pro-democracy movement in Iran is to mobilize its forces to launch a massive social movement to change the balance of power. Since the 1979 revolution there has been no such massive movement with a specifically defined agenda of changing the structure of the regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran has not till today confronted such a movement and demand for us to see how it would respond to it and how far it is willing to use violence to suppress it. While the Iranian regime does have the potential to engage in massive and bloody crackdown similar to the ones in Libya and Syria there are doubts of whether it can actually engage in such massive criminal and bloody violence. This has not been tested so far. The weak personality of the leadership is a factor that may prevent something like this from happening. There can be splits within the IRGC, particularly the remnant cadre of the war. The deterrent role of the army and its non-ideologic nature cannot be ignored. So Libyaization of Iran is not a positive or useful option under current conditions in Iran. The priority today is to create effective plans and a powerful leadership to take the social forces out of its current stagnation and inaction.
The third episode relates to conditions that must be present for the Libyaization. Two factors must be present: a powerful social movement which is determined to change the oppressive regime, and a strong leader who is trusted by the movement in harmony with the demands of the people calling for change. There must also be the will to pay a price for the goals. The second factor is the presence of a merciless oppressive regime which has no qualms in killing thousands of protestors and which will use planes and tanks to battle unarmed people. This level of cruelty must be actually presented on the scene. It is only then that conditions will be ready for the international community to intervene. The view that by creating a council of representative of different political factions outside the country can lead to events similar to those in Libya is superficial.
In view of these, a Libyaization of Iran under the current conditions is only a reflection of megalomaniac dreams and far from the realities of Iran and those of the international community at large.
