Whatever one calls Mr. Ahmadinejad’s unprecedented eleven-day absence from the presidency, it cannot be doubted that the costs exceeded the benefits. Some have tried to explain this perplexing decision by invoking Ahmadinejad’s faith in supernatural forces, similar to his earlier claim that he was surrounded by a halo of light.
First, Ahmadinejad lost credibility by not heeding to the advice of the old political establishment. Second, as the famous Persian poet Saadi says, the whole town knows when sorrow sits in, and this was not prudent either. Experienced mother-in-laws always tell their brides to make sure their demands would be met before making them. It must be said that, despite best efforts on both sides to blame the Islamic republic’s enemies and foreign media outlets for fanning the flames, everyone knows that the differences were internal. In the end, the glass was shattered.
When we set aside the paranoid assertions, which can be found in hardline Kayhan daily’s editorials, as well as some of the analyses circulating outside Iran, Ahmadinejad’s absences had only one reason. On the basis of that reason, it is not difficult to predict that some very tough and difficult days are awaiting the country: this year because of the upcoming parliamentary elections, and through the presidential election two years from now. Those who think that cold and uncontroversial elections are approaching are mistaken, in my opinion, just as much as people who predicted the same two months before the 2005 presidential election.
I will say it clearly: There is only one reason that will make confrontations between Mr. Ahmadinejad’s team and the other political factions, including the conservative faction, endure over the next two years. Mr. Ahmadinejad wants to stay in power, regardless of whether that can be achieved through succession by his chief of staff or a senior advisor. His aim is to keep his team intact and in power. One who has carefully planted his family members, relatives, friends, and allies in various public positions did not do so intending to give up power in 2005. One who, under the guise of decentralization and privatization, has monopolized the distribution of financial resources through a network of allies across the nation, and now seeks to expand his network into the parliament, would not be willing to leave the scene four years later.
Whatever else the two parties pretend to be fighting about, the fight is only over this. In the remaining years, if Mr. Ahmadinejad insists on implementing his plan (which is unacceptable to the other side), a confrontation will break out that would be unprecedented, not only in the thirty-some year history of the regime, but in the history of the Iranian state.
It appears that all sins are permitted in the Islamic republic, except of one: the sin of making the position of the second person in command (the president) permanent too. In a day and age were global events dictate more active participation by the populace in government affairs, it seems a joke for Mr. Ahmadinejad’s team to think that they can do what Hashemi Rafsajani could not do. The eleven-day absence must have awakened the self-loving president from his slumber.
