The emergence of divisions between the supreme leader and the president demonstrated that Ahmadinejad’s team have plans for the future that are not acceptable to Mr. Khamenei and the radical Principalists. Ahmadinejad’s boycott will end soon and he will return to the president’s office to continue implementing his plans. But, in light of the recent events, and especially his public confrontation with the supreme leader, he needs time and tactical revisions to pursue his plans.

Ahmadinejad’s team thinks that it can score victory competitive elections in the future in the absence of the reformists. Ahmadinejad thinks that the votes he has received over the years were cast for him personally, and that he therefore can count on those votes. Up to now, the Ahmadinejad team had been able to gain the partial support of the lower classes through advertising his administration’s achievements in villages and small towns, distributing goods in underdeveloped areas, and speaking about justice, the president’s simple lifestyle, and his stand against corruption. His team feels even more confident about his support among the lower classes since the implementation of the subsidy reform law.

Now the Ahmadinejad team seeks to gain support among the middle class, particularly those segments that are interested more in cultural and social, rather than political, reforms. They take this combination of support to guarantee their victory in future elections. It is strategically important for them to take a majority of the seats in the parliament, so that they can align the legislature with the executive against the unelected institutions, and force those institutions into retreat.

But serious challenges await this plan, undermining its chances of success under normal political conditions.

First, the plan has a delusional element to it because it is not based on a realistic assessment of the situation. The main base of support for Ahmadinejad’s team was always the supreme leader’s absolute support, which no longer exists. Obviously, a significant portion of Ahmadinejad’s base of support will abandon him with the supreme leader. He must thus be able to attract new bases of support, outside the regime’s usual base.

Further, some of Ahmadinejad’s supporters backed him on because he was in power. History shows that many senior figures in the Islamic Republic have switched sides whenever their side was in a weaker position. If Ahmadinejad severs his relationship with the supreme leader, many of his supporters will abandon him.

Ahmadinejad’s only option now is to break the regime’s internal deadlock by attracting the support of the silent majority. But this quest faces serious obstacles.

The biggest challenge facing the Ahmadinejad team is a trust deficit. His team is disfavored among the people and especially those seeking reform, and this problem cannot be solved easily.

Furthermore, the discrepancy between the demands of the lower and middle classes makes it difficult to gain the support of both.

Therefore, the prospects of victory for Ahmadinejad’s team are dim. He can be set aside just as quickly as rose to power¾unless Ahmadinejad pulls out a surprise, such as revealing secrets about the controversial 2009 presidential election, or speaking directly against the supreme leader, or call his supporters into the streets. Such a move would amount to political suicide, benefitting the green movement and those seeking change.