The remarks of Tehran’s prosecutor Jaafar Dolatabadi last week washed Mohammad Khatami’s hands off and immediately ended the latter’s proposed strategy for a return of Iran’s reformers to the political scene. In rather crisp words, he interpreted Khatami’s “conditions” for political return as his demands and in a way ruled him out by saying that he had lost the historic opportunity to return to the fold of the regime and therefore must stop his activities and get ready to be tried.[1]

Earlier, the sharp remarks that Kayhan’s editor had made regarding Khatami’s speech to Majlis’ minority faction had also revealed the other issues that reformers would face if they wanted to change course and be accepted by the regime.

In view of the events of the Green Movement and the approach that the ruling circles in Iran have regarding the opposition, the strategy of returning to elections that Khatami envisions - regardless of whether it is the right approach or not - has no chance of success.

Kayhan newspaper, whose general policy is in clear line with the policies of the supreme leader accuses Khatami of secretly meeting George Soros whom the sick editor of the daily calls one of the main leaders of the velvet coup in Iran, of being friends with NATO chief Rasmussen and Danish cartoonist who offended Muslims with his cartoons, of grouping with the Mojahedin Khalq armed group in Iraq, with the Bahais, royalists, Marxists, with the Pejvak group during the 2009 turmoil, an instance of Israel’s huge capital in Iran, defending Israel on Palestine Day, the burning of a mosque, the murder of Basiji militiamen, and executing the plans prescribed by Soros, Gene Sharp and Richard Rorty to accomplish the velvet revolution in Iran.[2] But Shariatmadari goes even further and in a television program on December 29, 2010 claims that the decision for Iranian reformers to participate in the 2009 presidential election was an American plot which had been planned at Stanford University.

These baseless and laughable assertions which are the normal business of police-like and disinformation-prone Kayhan newspaper, label Khatami with such adjectives that put him in the same soup with groups and individuals that Khatami himself says are the enemies of the revolution and regime! It should be noted that what Shariatmadari writes and says are not merely his personal views but are supported by the government, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps leaders and the Basij, the military officers that follow the supreme leader, the leading figures of the ministry of intelligence, the leadership in the judiciary, the Islamic revolution faction in the Majlis, and key elements among the principlists. The other parts of the principlists who are also critical of the administration, but who in comparison with the extremist elements are less fascistic also use similar language to denounce Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi. The reason this latter group has not taken a sharp position against Khatami is that it hopes that he would denounce the Green Movement and officially distance himself from Mousavi and Karoubi, at the same announce his regret for supporting the Green Movement. Khatami’s apparent desire to keep his distance from the Green Movement and his suggestion of a softer approach regarding the current issues in the country than what Karoubi and Mousavi advocate are the foundations of this group of principlists. The members of this faction believe that Khatami can purge the reform movement from those elements that are advocating a structural change in the Islamic republic.

But despite Khatami’s distinct positions that are not exactly identical to those of Karoubi and Mousavi, he has overall defended the positions of the two other opposition leaders. Still it is very unlikely that he would heed to the pressures to denounce the Green Movement, which if he did would deeply damage the support he now enjoys within the reform camp and such an act would in fact constitute political suicide.  On the other hand, since the regime and the principlists demand that Khatami expressly and fully renounce the protestors and reformers, as the first step to be accepted by the regime, it is clear that Khatami’s lacks any influence to impact the thinking, strategy or behavior of the regime.

Most of the available evidence suggests that the regime had decided to exclude Khatami from itself. It should be noted that after the election, Kahtami has not met with supreme leader ayatollah Khamenei, and there are reports that the supreme leader has a negative view of Khatami regarding his domestic and international practices. Furthermore, the leader has not differentiated much between the leaders of the opposition and views them all in the same pot, as microbes, the hope of the enemies and unwise. Only one person among the principlists, Hassan Ghafoorifard has said that Khatami remains inside the regime from Khamenei’s perspective.[3]

Some of the indicators that Khatami is viewed to be outside the regime by the regime are the increased filtering of his website, greater restrictions on the activities of his Baran foundation, preventing him from delivering his talk at Tehran University, and being kept on the export control list (i.e., banned from leaving Iran), and that he can operate from the outside, similar to Iran Freedom Movement and some other national-religious groups when they too left the regime and joined the opposition. He no longer enjoys the security that is provided to individuals who are considered to be part of the regime.

If Khatami’s latest remarks are merely to prepare himself to become a candidate in the next Majlis elections, it is clear that this goal is unattainable and officials will not allow him to participate. At best, those in power may use him to raise the heat in the elections and then at the right moment undermine him by disqualifying him. Under the best of conditions, only a very limited number of Majlis seats will be given to low-level activists with the minimal value to the reformist camp.

So the real question that comes up under these conditions is what does Khatami mean by reformism? Which reform principles did the reformists in the 8^th Majlis adhere to? What results did their presence in the Majlis have on the Iranian people and its pro-democracy movement? Did they impact the performance of the hardline principlists? While the key reformist figures are today behind bars and their important parties dissolved, how can one talk of participating in elections or set preconditions for participation? In view of the bloodshed that has followed the 2009 presidential elections where many people have paid a heavy price and the brutal violence perpetrated by the regime, such a position by Khatami is irresponsible. How can one expect this regime which faces serious charges of electoral fraud and has in practice shown that it has absolutely no qualms about imposing its will to hold honest and transparent elections?

The position that Khatami has taken – i.e., to return to elections – exposes him to being accused of selling the reformist cause and making a deal with the rulers, even though one cannot categorically make such a conclusion. On the other hand, Khatami’s insistence on working within the rules of the current political order, invariably puts him in a position that favors election, advocating full or partial support for participation.

It is possible that through his participation-election posture, Khatami is merely expressing the red lines and basic demands of the reformists so as to clarify the position of reformers in the upcoming elections while at the same time testing to see if the regime is willing to listen to reformers.

But even the attainment of this goal is doubtful. The regime has shown, through past elections, that it does not respect the principles of free and fair elections at all three levels of the process, i.e., registration, implementation and vote counting. The regime has spent a tremendous amount of capital to remove the groups that it calls the fifth pillar of the enemy or the perpetrators of the coup, and therefore will never allow them to return to the legal sphere of politics. Also, Khamenei and the right movement never accepted what was known as the Khate Imam (Imam’s line) groups also known as the leftwing groups inside the regime as one of their own and have always been working to set them aside. Today, Khamenei believes he has accomplished his 21-year wish, so he will not allow them under normal conditions to return to the fold and be acceptable.

Khatami’s record too shows that he will not stay ground on his own red lines. Just as he retreated from his threats to resign if his two main bills – reform the election process and increase the powers of the president – were not approved in the Majlis and then accepted the facetious elections of the seventh Majlis. Reformists have always set conditions prior to elections and have presented conditional participation as their election strategy, but eventually, they retreated and in fact joined the others and participated in the elections without their conditions having been met. Since free elections in reality mean relatively free elections, the issue is open to different interpretations and so never materializes on the ground. For some, the very fact that there are various election options , is enough to qualify the event as free.

But an election in which only reformers and principlists participate falls short of being really free. In Iran, the main problem with elections is their ineffectiveness in the sense that they never result in the transfer of power. The whole process and elements of elections in Iran are flawed. The analysis of political groups supporting participation in elections demonstrates that they advocate elections the moment they believe there is the slightest chance  and have in reality not put up any conditions.

But the most objectionable part of Khatami’s recent remarks is his definitions that separate the enemies of the revolution and those who oppose the constitution. As an individual, he certainly has the right to oppose what he does not like. Problems begin when he speaks from the position of defending people’s participation in elections. From the perspective of those who advocate participation in political events, democracy is a defined and known approach that takes you to an unknown result.

Khatami’s positions do not add up and lack logical coherence. On one hand he portrays the Iranian nation in very general terms while on the other he represents them realistically. A nation is  beyond generalization and one cannot present a static or fixed definition of it. One of the great benefits of elections is that they provide the opportunity to learn of the ever-changing political and social moods of people.

Khatami regularly warns leaders of the regime, including the supreme leader, that if the doors remain shut to them, more radical views and groups who oppose the constitution and the values of ayatollah Khomeini will become dominant. In other words, his definition of democracy includes only those who support the current political order and the founder of the Islamic republic. He believes that elections are valid only within the confines of the Islamic republic regime and the Islamic revolution. This view is very similar to that of the Guardians Council which reduces people’s choices to what the regime offers. Khatami’s democracy is at best a semi-democracy that is dominated by the view of insiders and outsiders. He openly warns that if reformers do not participate in the regime, unwanted voices will dominate society which neither the reformers nor the rulers approve. The foundations of his views on state and government do not differ with those of the principlists or even Khamenei’s foundations. The only difference is that he desires a larger field of operation within the regime. Democracy on the other hand opens the door to everyone. Ayatollah Khomeini, the narrative of the Islamic republic, its constitution and Islamic order are not divine concepts nor do they reveal eternal truths. They are not even the core beliefs of Islam. Opposition to them is the right of every political or social thinker. In the paradigm that views man as independent, free, rational, good-natured, and free from historical baggage, there is no place for sanctifying human constructs that are born out of an election. Furthermore, these constructs and ideas have taken shape through legitimately questionable means. Even if we assume they were correct and had no flaws, they only belong to one election which can always change and so they must regularly be tested by public opinion. Particularly since more than 50 percept of the current population of Iran never had a role in building these constructs and therefore is merely carrying the burden of what its predecessors built.

The concept of “enemy” that is the daily fodder for the Iranian masses – also used by Khatami - is a tension creating term, which has different meanings. Some believe that the Islamic republic and the views of ayatollah Khomeini deserve the term “enemy of people” and “enemy of the motherland” because they have destroyed the country. So the use of such terms only complicates issues and deepens the tensions and stress levels in the divergent Iranian nation.

The use of this term is also in contradiction with the principles of social participation, human rights and the paradigm of freedom. The enemy, in the minds of Khamenei and other totalitarian thinkers has an important use whose utility can mobilize the masses against the enemies of the organizers with the goal of protecting its narrow interests, and eliminating those it perceives to be opposing it. From the perspective of democracy, on the other hand, this dichotomy of friend and foe has no place and meaning. Every political and social view has the right to participate in social and political competitions and there is no dominance of one group, ideology or person over others.

The validity of any thought is tested through free elections and competition of ideas. One cannot deny a view or an idea on the excuse that it has no popular basis and no group can do this. People’s view and choices change in time. They  and can continue legitimately  if they are repeatedly tested through elections and through competition with other ideas and views that the public hold.

Such a view is also contrary to human morals because through it somebody is eliminated, his human rights are negated and his freedoms are tramped on. All this is done for the purpose of creating a special position for the group or individuals who is doing it.

The key flaw in Khatami’s new position that makes it inoperative, is the disregard for the negative view that the ruling circles and power-holders in Iran have who do not demonstrate any meaningful differentiation between Khatami and those whom Khatami calls enemies from whom he tries to differentiate. Khatami who is himself unacceptable by the regime, can at best be the vehicle that clears the way to the dissolution of the regime and, in the words of the supreme leader, eventually corrupt the faith of the people.[4]

In conclusion, Khatami’s antics in proving his loyalty to the political regime will not move Khamenei and the security-military individuals that support him in resolving the current impasse. From the perspective of Khamenei supporters such as Mehdi Taeb, Khatami is in a dream and does not understand the march of the enemy, and there is no hope for his awakening, which may only happen with death.[5] The only logical outcome of Khatami’s position and views is that he will face more problems from the public, something that the regime will use to his detriment that will result in the loss of his social position.