Two weeks after Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s 17th statement, I can say with greater certainty that the message has changed the tumultuous atmosphere in Iran. It has now been redirected toward finding a political solution to the crisis. I say this in light of the horrific events during the Ashura protests and the subsequent, less enthusiastic pro-government rallies. Mousavi’s statement has helped calm the apprehension of our activists and bolster their hope while also marking the “overthrow of the establishment” or an “inevitable blood-bath” as increasingly unlikely options, Moreover, Mousavi has neutralized the tactics of terror and intimidation utilized by the establishment. Mousavi’s innovation has paved the path for rational decision-making in order to move the country further away from falling into a whirlpool. It was also very timely.

The type of demands raised in the 17th statement and the tone of the document were selected with the goal of shifting the balance of power between the protesters and the government, and thus facilitate the achievement of those demands. And the statement succeeded in doing so, because, it has:
- Created more unity and trust among the protesters, and,
- Divided government officials and increased the tensions among them.

Here is some evidence for this.

- Among the protesters, there has been positive feedback from almost all its various inclinations. Virtually no one has opposed it, inside or outside Iran. Dozens of statements have been issued by various groups in favor of and backing the statement.

- Among those in power, there was has been no unified reaction, but the statement has widened the gap within their ranks. For example, Mohsen Rezaei partially backed the statement and has suggested finding a compromise; Ali Larijani defended Rezaei, which resulted in others attacking both of them; the Majlis held a closed-door session and Ruhollah Hosseinian publicly issued a resignation letter; Mortezavi’s fate is in question; Ali Motahhari gave an important interview with the state-run TV; and most significantly, the leader ayatollah Khamenei continues to remain indecisive and silent on how to deal with Mousavi, Karroubi, and the public.

The statement has increased the trust that activists have in Mousavi as a politician, and, has strengthened his position among the public. Furthermore, it has driven the government one step closer to accepting Mousavi as the “voice of the other side”.

The 17th statement was also very precise in terms of its political content. From its perspective, fundamental social change has been acknowledged while its consequences have been understood. The core of the statement is an effort to reconcile the Islamic Republic with these changes, and the demands that they have given rise to. It also warns those in power that refusing to see these profound changes in Iranian society will only lead to a blind and inconclusive confrontation with people and the fate of the country.

We are approaching a point where a large and determined section of the Islamic Republic’s ruling establishment is coming to the conclusion that for the sake of the survival of the regime and its cohesion, the risk of attacking people and eliminating the opposition – assuming hypothetically that this is a possibility- is higher than the cost of tolerating the opposition. Every day more people from within the government understand that the policy of oppression and elimination will eventually turn the tensions between the two sides into an explosion and greater loss of hope in unifying the government under the policy of merciless oppression. The spirit of Hosseinian’s resignation letter reveals much of the depth of the agitation among the governing forces. A significant number of the “former group of devoted supporters of the supreme leader” have realized that oppressing the reformists is a preface to their own oppression and that accusations of hypocrisy and espionage may fire back at them.

Until recently, the moderates inside the conservative camp thought that the “solution” lay in drawing the line between Karroubi and Mousavi, and the democratic movement, and making them reject the modern democratic forces. Karroubi and Mousavi’s approach convinced them that this was impossible. The power of new conditions has destroyed the divide between “insiders” and “outsiders” and no one can restore this. They have understood that eliminating Mousavi means confrontation with half of the Iranian people, the more powerful half. The situation in Tehran and major cities has showed them that Mousavi is the representative of the part of the Islamic Republic that is backed by the more modern and powerful half of the population.

Mousavi and Karroubi’s resistance and the strong support they have in the large cities, has persuaded a section of the regime that separating them – through the use of force, if that is what it takes - from their popular base (i.e., the Iranian society) in order to redefine the former boundaries of the Islamic Republic is an unachievable goal. The current leader of the Islamic Republic is practically no longer the leader of the whole the Islamic Republic of Iran, and, those opposing him have the definite and very active support of a significant portion of Iranians.

The leader of the Islamic Republic is facing a very crucial decision. He either has to accept the risk of a “dual leadership” and the “right of existence and competition for the opposing forces” inside the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, or he can choose to escalate the confrontation with the opposition which will lead to turning the tensions within the establishment into explosions and severe international isolation and will thus bring about the possibility of the collapse of the whole establishment.

Nevertheless, it is still too early to say that the right for democratic competition between the main groups inside the Islamic Republic has been accepted within the establishment. Even if this approach is revived among some in the higher levels of the power hierarchy, there is a very serious risk of assassinations and subversion to take place. The armed attack on Karroubi’s vehicle and Mousavi’s nephew’s assassination are clear warnings of this type. We may very well be in the beginning phases of a complex and turbulent political process. There is still a long way with many ups and downs, many twists and turns before we can change the balance of power in our political institutions and reform their structure, before we can devise new laws and legislate them, and before we can make actual changes in the lives of our people and fulfill their fundamental demands.

We are melting this iceberg from every direction. The winter may end much sooner than we thought last year. Wherever you look, hope is visible, can be heard and smelled. This means that the scent of spring will here soon. Let’s believe in the spring.