Discussions are taking place in formal and non-formal gatherings about when the U.S. President ‎Barack Obama must begin direct negotiations with Iran.‎

Those who oppose talks between the American government and Mr. Ahmadinejad's ‎administration argue that such negotiations would benefit Ahmadinejad ahead of the presidential ‎election in Iran, and that he must not be strengthened. I do not believe that this argument is ‎valid.‎

In my opinion, negotiating with the American government would not benefit Ahmadinejad and, ‎therefore, if the current Iranian president really is willing to engage in such negotiations, it is the ‎American side that is loosing the game through its procrastinations. ‎

In Iran, except for certain radical political or religious currents, very few ordinary people are ‎principally opposed to talks with the US. Indeed, these radical political and religious currents ‎are committed supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad.‎

Negotiations with America would pit Mr. Ahmadinejad and his hardcore support base against ‎each other: his supporters would be then forced either to take a stance against the administration ‎and, in the worst case scenario, mobilize their supporters against Mr. Ahmadinejad, which would ‎mean their exclusion from the supporters of the administration; or they would be forced to ‎openly defend dialogue with America and find a religious justification for it, resulting in the ‎destruction of the foundations of the confrontational ideology that they have devised and ‎propagated in recent years in order to curb the reform movement.‎

In my opinion, the separation of radicals from the administration or their endorsement of ‎negotiations with America both are beneficial to the Iranian society and, eventually, the ‎moderate movement in Iran.‎

Nevertheless, not only in the Western world but also inside Iran, some reformists are afraid that ‎certain layers of society may interpret negotiations between America and the Ahmadinejad ‎administration as a foreign policy victory for Ahmadinejad, thereby increasing their votes for ‎Ahmadinejad.‎

However, such a fear is unfounded because, first, different layers of society do not cast their ‎votes based on a standard set of parameters, and secondly, if the social reality in Iran is that Mr. ‎Ahmadinejad has failed to deliver on his promises, one must not be worried about his success in ‎one particular field.‎

If we believe that negotiations with America are beneficial to Iran, what is wrong if it happened ‎during Mr. Ahmadinejad's tenure, and all of the contradictory repercussions of such an action be ‎spent from his capital?‎

In my opinion, currently only Mr. Ahmadinejad has the appropriate position and courage to ‎begin negotiations with America, and if another person, especially from the reformist camp, is ‎set to replace him, this task would be very difficult and costly, because radical forces would once ‎again engage in remaking the anti-America ideology to destroy any prospects for talks.‎

In any case, I am hopeful that White House officials do not accept Mr. Sarkozy's suggestion of ‎waiting for the presidential elections in Iran before starting talks with Iran. ‎

In my opinion, in certain, very tangled situations, moderate political concessions from a hardliner ‎and radical leader can bear more fruit than the labor of dozens of moderate leaders. ‎