Tuesday, 27 Jan 2009
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opinion article

January 27, 2009

Reemergence of “Rogue Elements”

Hossein Bastani
Hossein Bastani
h.bastani(at)roozonline.com

The start of the crisis in Gaza coincided with the reemergence of a dangerous phenomenon in Iran: the notable increase in the activities of plain-clothes SWAT strike teams. Since the birth and engagements of these groups, Iranian authorities have tried to portray them as “rogue” elements. But critics of the regime view these groups as part of the government machinery and they point to inaction of responsible government agencies as a response to the assault of the teams.

So let’s take a look at some of the events inside Iran that were carried out by forces using plain-clothesmen after the Gaza crises erupted: the occupation of a building belonging to the British embassy in Tehran; an attack on the Egyptian Interests Section; attacks on the embassies of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, etc; an attack on Nobel Peace laurette Shirin Ebadi’s residence; and more recently an attack on peaceful women marchers in front of the UN building in Tehran with chants of “Death to Peace Seekers!” In all of these instances the attacks of the plain-clothesmen used violence as they happened in front of the police.

In those cases where the targets were non-Iranian, the police did make some attempts to intervene, while in one specific case government authorities say a few critical words regarding the attackers. The specific instance refers to the representative of the supreme leader of Iran at the universities who called the groups that attacked buildings belonging foreign interests as “Basij students” and asked them not to “enter” the embassies, while at the same time asking the police to “respect the mood of the students.”

But in those cases where the targets were Iranians (the Nobel Peace prize winner or the mother peace-seeking demonstrators) the government did not display any opposition to what these groups of plain-clothesmen were going and the police too did not even attempt to engage in any preventive or defensive action. It is instructive to note, for example, that even after the UN Secretary General condemned the attack on Shirin Ebadi’s residence, and the Iranian government was forced to respond, a statement came from the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry which included a request from Shirin Ebadi to “welcome the freedom and civil joy of student activism” and “raise your level of endurance”, reminding her that “unilateralism cannot be useful in society.” Whatever the meaning of these words is, the message does not express the government’s displeasure from future attacks on Ebadi.

Let’s look further back. The strikes of organized plain-clothesmen SWAT teams increased the most during Mohammad Khatami’s years and they targeted reformers. This was a time when the executive branch of government was in the hands of reformers and conservatives faced the non-cooperation of government agencies in their drive to confront protestors, particularly pro-Khatami students. As a result, these SWAT teams gained the support of and equipped themselves with instruments belonging to extremely violent circles on the Right. In many situations they embarked on violent crackdown of political and student gatherings. In those days, reformers declared that the members of these violent groups were not regular citizens but official members of military organizations (i.e. Basij in particular) which benefited from the direct support of powerful institutions (specifically the Passdaran Revolutionary Guards).

After the end of Khatami’s administration, many analysts believed that the life of these plain-clothesmen groups were over. This was because they thought that during Ahmadinejad’s administration, the security and intelligence agencies that were affiliated to the executive branch were already sufficiently active in the crackdown of the regime’s opponents, and so there really was no need for non-professional plain-clothesmen.

But the recent repeated operations of plain-clothesmen in Iran prove that hardliners’ need for such so-called “rogue” groups is never ending. In the first place, they are used against critics who the regime believes have violated its red lines and thus need to be taught a lesson, while at the same time authorities do not wish to officially take the responsibility of crushing these groups (which is true when they confronted Shirin Ebadi as a signal to human rights advocates that even international support at its highest levels would not make these Iranian activists immune from attack). Following that, they are used for propaganda purposes that hardliners need concerning foreign issues. This is true regarding situations where the government is not in a position to formally react to crises that pop up in the Islamic world (such as attacking foreign embassies while Israel’s military operations in Gaza are underway because hardliners while being afraid of undertaking any measures outside Iran desire to present themselves as the most staunchest supporters of Palestinians).

At the height of the sit-in protest of a group of Iranian Basij students who were demanding to be sent to Gaza to fight with Israel, an Iranian commander during the 8-year war between Iran and Iraq, Saeed Ghasemi, said this to the protestors: “A real soldier is someone who fights 20 kilometers ahead of his leader so that the leader can perform his command duties.” He explained what he meant in an interview, “Unfortunately some use the pretext that they must follow the leader and in reality become an obstacle to the offensive moves of revolutionary forces. A revolutionary event is what the attackers on the American embassy did in Tehran in 1979, who took over the embassy without telling Imam Khomeini who thanked them when he heard of it. A real soldier must attack ahead of everybody else and not hide himself behind the leader or the commander.”

These words may be viewed as a clear strategy regarding the so-called “rogue” elements and their hardliner supporters. If state authorities are really displeased with the operations of the strike teams, called “rogue” groups, can they not at the least announce that they do not approve of such statements? Particularly in a country where even a pro-government news agency is shut down for publishing a “lie” about a member of the cabinet.


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