Following months of simpleminded speculations surrounding the establishment of "transparent" ties between Iran and America through, for example, the opening of a US interests section in Tehran, current developments related to Tehran-Washington talks are proceeding exactly as was initially predicted: closed-door talks.
Recently the Iranian Majlis Speaker, noting the possibility of America's participation in nuclear talks with the Islamic Republic, emphasized, "Currently, we are in a different situation. One can use the 5+1 framework to discuss the nuclear issue, or one can use other frameworks" (Mehr news agency, February 2, 2009). In this connection, one American source (the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs) revealed news of four rounds of secret talks between representatives of the Islamic Republic and their American counterparts in four European capitals in 2008. The talks were attended, according to this source, by Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, Iran's permanent ambassador to the International Atomic and Energy Agency as well as Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, senior advisor to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the topic of discussion being the Islamic Republic's nuclear program and security concerns of both sides with respect to the Middle East peace process and regional economic and trade issues. More importantly, in reacting to this news the ninth administration's Minister of Intelligence refused to deny talks being held between Iranian and US officials, only noting, "The meaning discussion is different from negotiation.” In other words, according to the Minister of Intelligence, what transpired between representatives of Iran and the US were "discussions," not "negotiations" (IRNA, February 2, 2009).
Comparing what is taking place in "real politics" between Iran and America with assumptions that ran rampant a few months ago regarding symbolic gestures such as the "establishment of a US interests section in Tehran to ease relations between peoples of both nations" teaches important lessons about the nature of and possible solutions to the Tehran-Washington crisis.
Let us recap our prediction six months ago about the direction of US-Iran relations, soon after the-then US Secretary of State announced the administration’s desire to establish a US interests section in Tehran, and the Iranian president voiced support for the plan (even the Islamic Republic Ministry of Interior announced that it would take full responsibility for physical safety of American diplomats in Tehran). At that time, we emphasized that both Ms. Rice and Mr. Ahmadinejad are talking about something that is impossible (at least until they both are in charge). Let us recap parts of that prediction.
Even if the talk about communicating with the Iranian people was not serious, and the actual goal of having a diplomatic presence in Iran is to get closer to the Islamic Republic government, is the physical presence of American envoys in Tehran the best way to achieve that? Even if the Islamic Republic government has at last been convinced that it needs to have a serious and direct talks with the United States, which is quite possible, why should it host the talks in Tehran, rather than Baghdad, Geneva, Ankara, etc.?... Is it not better for the Iranian government to negotiate with the United States behind closed doors? … One must note that, on the American side too, the main essence of worries and concerns are security-strategic. As a result, it is hard to imagine that, unless Iran accepts significant strategic concessions - from absolute suspension of uranium enrichment in the short run to recognizing Israel on the long run - the Bush Administration is prepared to normalize relations with Iran and open an interest section there… Of course, any prediction depends on time, and predictions about not opening a United States interest section in Tehran is not an exception to the rule. In summary, the above prediction does not mean that negotiations between the Bush and Ahmadinejad government could not possibly continue, or that it is never possible for American diplomats to be present in Iran. However, given the issues raised above, it seems that the proposal of the Bush Administration regarding opening and interest section in Tehran, so long as that administration is in charge, is not doable." (Rooz, "American Interest Section in Tehran?", Hossein Bastani, August 18, 2008).
We now end up at the place we predicted six months ago: the Bush Administration, without having made any progress in holding "transparent" presence in Iran, is out of power. In exchange, reports are published about secret talks between Iran and America, held in other countries, revolving around strategic issues (such as the nuclear case, the Middle East crisis, and both sides' security dilemmas) and promises are made about further talks among both countries' diplomats.
Of course, one cannot in principle be opposed to talks. In reality, the talks should have begun much earlier and their success certainly would benefit both countries as well as the entire region.
The benefits of such talks, however, are wholly unrelated to the fact that Mr. Obama's administration cannot disregard the impact of the "timing" of holding talks with Tehran on Iran's internal political developments.
Currently, fewer than five months remain until the presidential election in Iran. To Ahmadinejad's advantage, election campaigns are getting off ground exactly as the Obama Administration (which promised to hold talks with Tehran) takes charge. In this circumstance, there is no doubt that "resolving the three-decade Tehran-Washington crisis" would be a huge winning card in Mr. Ahmadinejad's deck ahead of the upcoming election.
Certainly, Mr. Obama has the right to follow whatever method conducive to his own country to begin talks with Tehran. However, he and his diplomats must keep in mind that if this issue turns into a catalyst in the next five months for Ahmadinejad's reelection, the Iranian people will hold the Obama Administration accountable for anything that might transpire in the next four years.
The Democratic administration's indirect interference in the Iranian election would not only harm both countries' interests, but also in the long-run add to the height of the "wall of mistrust" that exists among Iranians and Americans to its highest imaginable level.
