These days the problems for the June Iranian presidential elections facing the reformers ‎are newsy. They range from an absence of a clear strategy and plan, internal differences, ‎to personal and party disagreements.‎

So much attention is paid to these problems that the difficulties of the conservatives have ‎been almost forgotten, while their issues far outweigh those of the reformers.‎

The biggest problem of the conservatists is undoubtedly Mahmud Ahmadinejad, the ‎current president. He has succeeded in alienating almost every faction of the conservative ‎camp and many wish that he would simply take the exit from power.‎

The best scenario for the conservatists is that he refrains from running in the next ‎presidential race so that a consensus can be reached over another candidate. But such a ‎possibility is only a pipe-dream.‎

Mr. Ahmadinejad has absolutely no qualms about running in the June presidential ‎elections and even absolutely believes that he will win the race.‎

Because of this, conservatists are in disarray. If they pin another candidate against Mr. ‎Ahmadinejad, they will face two threats. The first is that this will divide their supporters ‎allowing their rival competitor to win the race. The second is that if Ahmadinejad is ‎reelected, he would take his revenge on those who dared to challenge him.‎

Under these circumstances, conservatists may see no other alternative but to support ‎Ahmadinejad with the condition that there would be some form of an agreement ‎regarding the members of the next cabinet. Ahmadinejad may accept such an ‎arrangement, although there is some doubt about this.‎

But even with this, one problem still remains for the conservatists: votes for Mr. ‎Ahmadinejad during the next elections. Contrary to the views of some analysts, including ‎those in the conservative camp, that Ahmadinejad enjoys relative popularity, there are ‎different reports coming from all corners of the country indicating that the incumbent’s ‎popularity is not completely satisfactory.‎

I believe that banking on Ahmadinejad, as conservatists have done, is a dangerous ‎gamble. If they wish to pull him out of the ballot boxes, they must become partners in a ‎broad election fraud and rigging. But such a plan will certainly leak to the public, ‎catapulting whatever credibility that elections in the Islamic may have left.‎

All this said, these problems of the conservatists should not be the cause of pleasure and ‎heart-warming for the reformers. The presence of a reformist in the presidential palace in ‎Tehran would soon turn out to be the beginning of a major catastrophe for the reformers, ‎which I have described elsewhere before and which I will touch on again in the future.‎

I believe that instead of working to defeat Ahmadinejad in the elections, reformers should ‎work to create a medium-term strategy to resolve the current impasse in the country. Part ‎of this strategy can be participation in the elections but only if someone like Abdullah ‎Nouri is the accepted presidential candidate.‎