During the height of the 2nd Palestinian Intifada when Yasser Arafat was shutting down ‎suicidal attacks while announcing his commitment to the peace process with Israel, I ‎wrote in an article that “my advise to the Palestinians is that if they want peace, then this ‎is not the way to go about it, while if they were bent on fighting, this was not the way ‎either.”‎

If I have things correctly, today not only have Palestinian suicidal attacks against Israel ‎suspended, but Ismael Hanieh’s administration in the Gaza strip calls those para-military ‎groups that fire Qassam rockets into Israel traitors to the Palestinian cause, arrests them, ‎and even punishes them. Things have changed to an unbelievable degree. ‎

So what I said to the Palestinians then, I can say to Iranian reformers particularly Jebhe ‎Mosharekat (Participation Front) and Sazeman-e Mojahedin Engelab-e Eslami (Islamic ‎Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution). “Dear friends, if your goal in the next presidential ‎elections is to create a massive social movement, then this is not the way to go about it. ‎But if your goal is simply to into the power game without any dangers and risks, then too ‎this is not the way.”‎

Until now I was under the impression that during these three years that the reformers ‎have stayed outside the channels of power and government, they would take a look at ‎their 8 years of failed reform activities and endeavors and critic their ways in ‎fundamental ways and reach new conclusions which they would use for the eight ‎presidential elections to be held next June. But it seems that only has this not happened, ‎and that there were no 8 years of reform attempts in the country! Everything seems to be ‎in the process of being repeated again: engaging in emotions, ignoring analysis, repletion ‎of promises and responding defensively.‎

The performance of this group of reformist friends unfortunately pushes me to return to ‎the first step and raise those very tens of questions that have repeatedly been raised. The ‎first decision that these friends must make is to conclude whether the 8 year reform ‎experience was a positive one or a negative one. If they interpret and conclude that the ‎period was a successful one, then they must respond to the question that how did the ‎seventh Majlis and the tenth president (both representing anti-reformist hardliners) come ‎to power after the reform years. If they view the efforts of the period to be a failure, then ‎they must analyze the causes of the failure and present them to the Iranian nation. ‎

I hear from some of the reformers that the cause for their failure was because of some ‎hardliners, while other reformers say that the cause was because of lost and unused ‎opportunities that existed for them, cautiousness and slow progress. But I ask my friends: ‎was the cause of the failure because the reforms were too fast or too slow? I think only by ‎answering this question will reformers be able to identify a roadmap for their own future.‎

If the failure was caused by the slow movement of reformers, the should not the president ‎‎(i.e. Mohammad Khatami) be acknowledged for his perseverance in his efforts? Is Mr. ‎Khatami, with all the knowledge that we know he possesses, really the right person to ‎expect to overcome the gradualness and problems of the movement through perseverance ‎and combativeness?‎

If on the other hand, the rapid pace of events is attributed to be the cause of the failure of ‎the reform movement then should we not be searching for a person who while winning ‎over the trust of those in power and by refraining from agitating them, can utilize and ‎capitalize the 20 percent of power that is said to be reserved for the executive branch of ‎government to promote the reform ideals? Is Mr. Khatami really someone who does want ‎to win over the hearts of those in power and not say anything to agitate them?‎

From my perspective Mr. Khatami is neither. From another perspective he may be both. ‎But regardless of this, I think Mr. Khatami is not suited for any of these two scenarios.‎

My final message is that the key reformist groups in Iran are so disunited and ‎contradictory in their goals and means that until they can create some form of unity and ‎consolidation, it is really futile to be so vehemently calling for Mr. Khatami to re-enter ‎the game, because just as his first shot in the field proved a tragedy, his return may turn ‎more into a comedy!‎