There are signs that on the eve of US elections in November some quarters in Iran are tempted to create another “October surprise.”
Probably the most unexpected October surprise in the US took place in 1980 and it was in connection with Iran. Tens of books and much more articles have been written in the 90s which narrate a secret deal between the Republican Party in the US and some members of Iran’s Islamic Republic Party, which at the time was the ruling party in Iran, with the goal of impacting the American November 1980 presidential elections. At the time, following the prolonged negotiations between Iran and the US over the release of American hostages in Iran, the Islamic Republic was close to releasing the hostages in October. Followers of the October surprise theory present events to show that senior members of Ronald Reagan’s elections campaign met and talked with some Iranian officials between July and October 1980 in Madrid and Paris with the goal of persuading the Iranians to release the hostages a bit later, i.e. after the November 4th presidential elections in the US. According to them, the benefit that the Republicans would derive from this “deal” would be to deprive Jimmy Carter, the Democratic presidential incumbent, from using the event to boost his popularity which he would gain from the return of the American hostages on the eve of the elections. For Iran, they argue, the benefit would be to acquire weapons and spare parts from the US which it badly needed in its war with Iraq. Although this view has supporters and opponents in the US, but the fact that the hostages were released 20 minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as the 40th president of the US on January 20, 1981, cannot be easily dismissed as coincidental.
Now, 28 years after the Iranian inventiveness in the defeat of the Democrats, unverified news in Tehran once again talk about the desire of some politicians in the country to repeat that game. And even though this story remains at the rumor level, its possible impact is of such magnitude that it deserves a deliberate consideration.
For someone like the Iranian president, the dream of impacting US elections is very enticing. Right from the day he came to office, Ahmadinejad has demonstrated an uncontrollable interest to play a “global role”. This desire has been so intense that it has manifested itself in unconventional forms such as letters to the heads of the major world powers or the claim of possessing “solutions to global issues”.
So it is natural that somebody like president Ahmadinejad, who as proof of his claimed “impact” on the world continuously launches new astounding initiatives, would not lose the slightest opportunity to impact the American elections – if he believed that he could do so. Particularly if in the US too there are circles who would like to impact the November 2008 elections by sitting at the negotiations table across Iranians.
The most important card for discussion for such a possible deal between the US and Iran in October may be the security of Iraq. More specifically, the central criticism of the Democrats against George Bush’s foreign policy concerns the presence and status of US forces in Iraq. Therefore, if negotiators in Iran and the US succeed in taking an action in the last month preceding the US elections that would dramatically highlight the success, or failure, of Bush’s policies in Iraq, this would undeniably impact public opinion in America. An impact of just 1-2 percent or even less on American voters can be decisive. After all, such a small fraction has historically decided the fate of some presidential elections in the past.
The nuclear issue and the relations between Tehran and Washington are also good candidates for a deal. And even though this issue, unlike the Iraq situation which has a direct bearing on American lives, is not as important, it does have the potential to impact public opinion in the US. During the last four years, the Bush administration has been the leading advocate for stopping Iran’s nuclear agenda and changing its strategic goals. Whether the US president will finally succeed in his promise of “containing Iran” or, as he departs the White House, will be the subject of ridicule by the rulers of “uncontained Iran”, has of course nothing directly to do with the interests of the American voters, but the event can be interpreted as a symbol of the position and “real power” of their country in the world. Therefore, “a very dramatic event” in connection with Iran and its nuclear case – in other words a pride-building victory or a humiliating defeat by Washington vis-à-vis Tehran – has the potential, even though on a smaller scale, of bringing the events of October 1980 to mind.
I would like to remind that the above scenarios are mere speculation whose chances and strength in signs remain ambiguous up to this moment. But it would be unreasonable to ignore such possibilities by political observes in Tehran and Washington. Still, one hopes that October too will pass for the nations of Iran and America with least costs.
