The Majlis onfirmation that Sadegh Mahsuli received is a good example of the ‎competitive framework that currently prevails among hardliners in Iran.‎

On the eve of the confirmation hearings, from the moment the “deal” between the Majlis ‎and the Administration made news headlines, it was clear that at the highest level of the ‎regime it had been decided that Majlis should not treat Mahsuli the way it had treated ‎Kordan (the removed minister).‎

It is not important that the new Interior Minister failed to get a 50+1 vote in the Majlis ‎and in a precedent-setting move got only 50+half votes, or that it never became clear ‎whether 270 representatives, or 273 or even 275 voted in the Majlis session, or that a ‎number of journalists attested to the withdrawal of a number of white (yes votes) cards ‎from the vice-Speaker’s pocket, or that the Speaker allocated the time set for one ‎opponent of Mahsuli to one proponent, or that the Majlis Speaker did not allow, in ‎response to the protests of the manner in which the votes were counted, the broadcasting ‎of the film of the confirmation voting on national television, etc.‎

It is also apparently not important that during the last 10 years, Mahsuli has added some ‎‎160 billion tomans to his wealth, part of which due to illegal oil swap with neighboring ‎countries by him, who had been the campaign manager of Ahmadinejad and now wishes ‎to be the “neutral” manager in the next elections in 2009, etc.‎

These and many other issues have been published in the media, including those belonging ‎to the conservatives, to such an extent that any more news on it does not add anything ‎new to the issues, and in fact is pathetic.‎

But what deserves a reminder is the ability to “channel political competition” among ‎government forces at times when the state is determined to do it.‎

Let’s not forget that the cabinet minister who emerged through this channeled ‎competition will soon himself be responsible for an election that will determine whether ‎the administration that is approved by the state stays or departs.‎

At that time, will respect for law compel someone like Mr. Mahsuli to push for elections ‎whose details and nature will be different from the type of voting that confirmed his own ‎nomination? It is difficult to respond to this with a positive answer. At that time, for ‎someone like him, “expediency of the regime” or “religious duty” will easily be the ‎justifications for manipulating the elections. And certainly the expediency of the regime ‎and the specific religious duty will be clear then by resorting to the leader’s views about ‎the lections.‎

It is under these circumstances that any political force that hopes to participate in the ‎presidential elections of 2009 will face this decisive question: How to deal with an ‎election that is managed by “Sadegh Mahsuli”?‎

Let’s take a look at the probable results of the elections right now: Is it possible that the ‎ministry of interior that will be run by Mahsuli will not engage in manipulating the ‎course of the presidential election? If we trust him and his allies, then we can start by ‎debating the qualifications of the candidates. But if such trust is lacking what measures ‎are we going to take to confront election violations caused by Mr. Mahsuli’s ministry of ‎interior. ‎

If seven months later, the same charade that was used in the Majlis session, in which ‎Sadegh Mahsuli received confirmation, are repeated in the election offices of the ministry ‎of interior, do we then have a right to pretend that we were caught off guard?‎