Former minister Ali Kordan’s ascent to the cabinet and then his fall from it is yet another example of a well-known scenario in the Islamic republic of Iran: Heeding to change at the worst time and in the costliest possible manner.
Certainly Kordan’s story and the costs the event imposed on Iran’s ninth administration since the 1979 revolution to defend him is not the last of its kind or even the most important event among similar acts. At the moment when President Ahmadinejad could prevent the response to a misdeed by withdrawing support from a dirty lie, he chose to present his “unconditional” support to the holder of the fake PhD degree. And when he was invited to deal with the issue, he first denied the existence of the fraudulent degree, and then described university diplomas as mere “pieces of paper”. And when the allies of the administration suggested that the canny minister himself resign from his position, the President encouraged him to resist. When the issue expanded to claims that Kordan’s Masters and even Bachelor’s degrees were forgeries as well, Ahmadinejad again defended his ally by claiming that many others too held fake degrees… And down the road when the attempt to bribe the Majlis representatives who had supported impeaching the minister was made public, Ahmadinejad again resisted calling the impeachment to be unlawful and spoke of boycotting his participation in such an “illegal” meeting.
The president’s support remained unwavering throughout this event to the extent that it had made some to wonder that perhaps he was sending his nominee to the clearly revolting Majlis while enjoying the support of the leader of the Islamic regime. The reality of course was something else. On the day of the impeachment of the minister, the leader did not get involved to support Kordan. Kordan’s defense during the hearings revolved around his being a chemical weapons war veteran, which he claimed he had not reveled to anyone till then, that he was a good person because Rooz Online had said that he was a “terrorist” and a “supporter of the clerical regime” , that he had a sick wife, and that his children were very upset about what their father had been subjected to, etc. But each of these defenses’ raised by Kordan were either laughingly brushed off during the impeachment hearings, objected to or expressly rejected by the representatives. Still, with the Majlis impeachment vote and the minister’s removal from his post, it has not become any clearer why did the administration remains supportive of Kordan, who even initially did not enjoy more than just 45 votes in the Majlis.
The impeachment proceedings have now ended and the result has been the most serious defeat of the last 3 years for Ahmadinejad’s administration. This defeat however did not result from the reformists or even moderates, but from its own former and current allies. And through this event, not only did the president displease many of his allies - making many angry - but it also brought about the most voluminous documented expose of and discredit to the ninth government at the public level.
The president’s partisan behavior with the Majlis over Kordan, was clearly the result of his grave mistake regarding the defensible nature of his Interior Minister. This miscalculation was probably based on his belief in ayatollah Khamenei’s unconditional support, and his hope to use it to ride the mounting challenge over his (former) minister of interior.
But this event also places a serious issue for ayatollah Khamenei, in whom the President relies to control his critics: Could unconditional support by the leader of the Islamic regime of Ahmadinejad result in outcomes similar to what the controversial minister of interior experienced?
Up till now, one may believe that the leader of Iran believes that Ahmadinejad is the most effective and capable authority to promote the goals of the leader of the regime and so it is necessary to fully support him. It is also clear that despite the president’s unusual behavior, the leader views it prudent to use his position to defend Ahmadinejad from his enemies and rivals.
But here is the important question: Does Ahmadinejad enjoy the necessary requirements for unlimited support? Does the President’s relentless drive to create tension, and new and still newer enemies (even amongst the most inner circles of conservatives in Iran) make it possible for any authority to throw in his support for a long period?
Ayatollah Khamenei knows better than others that all it takes to remove Ahmadinejad from power, is not to get engaged in the next presidential elections in his favor as a means of controlling the elections. Would it not be better if they left him and his allies to themselves, just as he did during the impeachment proceedings of Kordan in the Majlis?
