Many ask this question in Iran these days: When will the war start? Until now, common people did not take the possibility of a war seriously. Now they do. The reason for this shift is admissions by Islamic Republic officials about such a serious possibility.
Until recently, some hardline newspapers scrutinized other newspapers, accusing them of "frightening the public," "cooperating with enemy's psychological warfare against Iranian people," and "playing the role of the fifth column" whenever they mentioned the possibility of war. Now, however, top military and political officials talk about the serious possibility of war, Iran's preparedness to confront the enemy, and "digging hundreds of thousands of graves to bury enemy soldiers in Iran's border provinces."
In effect, these remarks have warned the masses, who listen to Islamic Republic's radio networks and watch its television channels, that a war is possible, and even that it is imminent.
Nevertheless, a question may still be posed, about how serious is the threat of war, and what the repercussions from Iran may be. In my opinion, the possibility of war at this moment remains fifty-fifty, but not much time is left before discarding one of the sides in favor of the other.
If we wish to examine the situation realistically and free of bias, the United States and its allies cannot tolerate an atomic Islamic Republic. If some domestic or international experts say the opposite, they are either attempting to baselessly please officials in Tehran or prefer their personal wishes to reality.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat clear that the United States and its allies believe that, at preset, imposing heavy political pressure and further economic sanctions by the international community would force Iran into abandoning her quest to fully master the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the timing is of absolute importance. In other words, there is now a speed race between the Iranian nuclear program reaching "the point of no return" and the effectiveness of international sanctions on the political regime. It is not yet clear which process will outpace the other.
If the speed of Iran's nuclear development exceeds the effectiveness of sanctions, the possibility of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would move toward becoming an actuality, and war, with all its destructiveness and repercussions, would break out. On the other hand, if the speed of effectiveness of sanctions exceeds that of Iran's nuclear progress, the possibility of war will diminish, even though Iranian society must tolerate painful economic sanctions.
I do not know how the head of Iran's National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, would attempt to shed light on Iran's ambiguous response to the proposed 5+1 package in his next meeting with the European Union's Javier Solana. However, if nothing other than the Iranian government's previous policy is behind Iran's ambiguous response, we would definitely face a round of draining sanctions, and war, if sanctions prove to be ineffective.
It seems like Iranian negotiators have selected the policy of buying time as a tactic, but it must not be forgotten that this tactic, even if it is used cleverly, has a limited reach, and the moment of saying yes or no will arrive very soon.
Some Iranians imagine that the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad government is intentionally pursuing an armed confrontation with the United States because it intends to suppress the domestic political atmosphere and decimate critical opponents. I do not agree with this viewpoint, precisely because of the purpose it notes. Inside Iran, there is no open atmosphere that requires closing by waging war. In addition, critical opponents do not have enough coherence and organization to pose danger to those in power, such that their suppression requires waging war against the world's largest superpower.
Some Iranians speculate that a foreign attack would be limited and quick. This also is doubtful, as such an attack's limitedness depends on Iran's lack of retaliation and being content to verbal threats and complaining to the United Nations. Is the Iranian political regime in a position to issue mere verbal responses to a foreign attack that resembles raping a country's family members?
That is highly unlikely, because not retaliating against a foreign attack conveys nothing other than the regime's disability and legitimacy crisis. Therefore, Iran would most likely attack their interests, which would be met with another round of attacks, engaging the two sides in an endless chain of retaliatory attacks and a full-fledged war whose result is the destruction of our country's resources and damage to other party.
Is this a pleasant scenario for leaders of the Islamic Republic after 30 years of governance?
