After the American State Department's announcement about opening an interest section office in Iran and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's public support for the proposal, a wave of analyses and speculation have swept over media networks outside Iran covering the possibility of an American diplomatic presence in Iran - and even speculating regarding the exact timing of such event. The presence of a similar wave inside the country is also easily discernible. The Islamic Republic's Interior Ministry recently announced that it will guarantee the security of American diplomats should they travel to Iran. In any case, although it is not always wise to swim against the current, I believe that diplomatic presence of the Bush Administration in Tehran would not take place.
In any speculation regarding the possibility of presence of the Bush Administration's diplomats in Iran, before anything, a key issue must be clarified, it being the cost-benefit calculation of the Iranian government should such an event take place. The reality is that for a regime with the characteristics of the Islamic Republic (please note that we are discussing a regime with very peculiar characteristics, and must therefore place our analysis on the peculiarities of this regime) the benefits of America's diplomatic presence in Iran are ambiguous and uncertain, whereas the costs are certain and clear.
Actually, what are the Islamic Republic's interests here? For instance, is what Condoleezza Rice has said (making communication with Iranian people possible) a "benefit" for the Islamic Republic? Is it hard to understand that communication between American officials with Iranian citizens and activists, inside Iran nonetheless, is considered a "security threat" by Tehran? Even if the talk about communicating with the Iranian people was not serious, and the actual goal of having a diplomatic presence in Iran is to get closer to the Islamic Republic government, is the physical presence of American envoys in Tehran the best way to achieve that? Even if the Islamic Republic government has at last been convinced that it needs to have a serious and direct talks with the United States, which is quite possible, why should it host the talks in Tehran, rather than Baghdad, Geneva, Ankara,….? For its "symbolic" aspect? Indeed, this symbolic aspect is the most significant factor that prevents the Iranians from tolerating the "Great Satan's" presence on their land. To prevent international sanctions or threats of military action against Iran? But this task has a clear precondition (suspending uranium enrichment): If this precondition is not satisfied, the costly presence of American diplomats in Iran would do no good in easing tensions, nor does the satisfaction of this precondition require opening an American interest section in the Islamic Republic's territory.
Is it not better for the Iranian government to negotiate with the United States behind closed doors, or at least in presence of a mediator, rather than hold such talks inside Iran where the Islamic Republic's security and police officers must await outside the meeting venue to confront extremist protestors mobilized by various competing factions inside the right-wing camp? Is there really a perception out there that Mr. Ahmadinejad's support for the presence of American diplomats in Tehran could convince the totality of the conservative camp, with all its internal conflicts, to support this proposal? Do we think that it is possible for Ayatollah Khamenei, for instance, to issue a "Fatwa" (religious decree") making it "Haraam" (forbidden by Islam) to oppose the presence of American diplomats in Iran in order to guarantee their security? Despite all hopes, it seems highly unlikely that such events take place, at least in the Iran that we are familiar with.
On the other hand, the reality is that the government in Tehran would bear a very serious cost in exchange for receiving uncertain and ambiguous benefit from presence of American diplomats in Tehran, that serious cost being the loss of its anti-American aura among hardliners inside the country and in the region. One must not forget that the Iranian government, correctly or incorrectly, is convinced that America is seeking to overthrow (whether peacefully or not) the Islamic Republic, and that this regime, to ensure its survival in face of destabilizing American operations, must defend itself. There is no logical reason to think that the presence of Bush administration diplomats in Tehran has the capacity to convince Iranian officials that there no longer is danger of Washington's overthrow actions. Meanwhile, the mere presence of American diplomats, which would be interpreted as a treacherous compromise, would seriously weaken the Islamic Republic's anti-American “popularity” in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and the Islamic world, in general. These forces, for good or bad, comprise the Islamic Republic's backbone of “resistance” in its confrontation with Israel and the United States. The Islamic Republic's deterrence strategy, regardless of whatever opinions we may have about it, has long been built on clear presumptions, one which is the inadequacy of international institutions in preventing a U.S.-instigated overthrow of the Islamic Republic. According to this strategy, just as international institutions were unable to - despite Saddam regime's cooperation with international disarmament organizations in its last years and months of existence - prevent the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad, they would be unable to prevent a similar occurrence with respect to Tehran and, as such, in order to circumvent having a fate similar to Saddam's, Tehran is forced to count on its own deterrent factors; where, anti-American forces inside and outside Iran are counted as main columns of deterrence. It is a mistake to regard "all" such forces as paid mercenaries (although many of them certainly are) who would easily adjust to Mr. Ahmadinejad's 180-degree turns in regional policies.
One must note that, on the American side too, the main essence of worries and concerns are security-strategic. As a result, it is hard to imagine that, unless Iran accepts significant strategic concessions - from absolute suspension of uranium enrichment in the short run to recognizing Israel on the long run - the Bush Administration is prepared to normalize relations with Iran and open an interest section there. Certainly, many politicians in America too would not tolerate any kind of normalization in relations so long as Iran does not quickly and clearly reconsider its prior positions with respect to aforementioned issues. As a result, because every one of the previously mentioned concessions has become a significant security-prestigious red line for the Iranian regime, normalizing relations with America has no meaning for Tehran other than pressure to simultaneously cross the Islamic Republic's most important red lines. In my view, the idea that the current Iranian government is capable of undertaking such revision in foreign policy in the few months remaining from Bush's term is very unlikely.
This restriction is a fact that is often, particularly outside of Iran, is neglected, so much so that every once in a while, when a “positive” statement is published from an Iranian official, we see a wave of commentary in the Western media dealing with the "Islamic Republic's revision" with respect to this or that clear red line (the latest instance of such waves concerned the Islamic Republic's revision of its policies with respect to Israel, after deputy to president Ahmadinejad claimed that Iranians consider "the people of Israel to be friends," which was quickly refuted by the speaker under pressure from other conservatives).
Of course, any prediction depends on time, and predictions about not opening a United States interest section in Tehran is not an exception to the rule. In summary, the above prediction does not mean that negotiations between the Bush and Ahmadinejad government could not possibly continue, or that it is never possible for American diplomats to be present in Iran. However, given the issues raised above, it seems that the proposal of the Bush Administration regarding opening and interest section in Tehran, so long as that administration is in charge, is not doable.
