It was the sixth Majlis elections and the cold winter of 2000, that is referred to as the Spring in Iranian politics: the era of flourishing newspapers, “the era of hope for reforms.” In those days, like thousand of other youngsters, with a heart full of hope, I would stand on street corners and crosswalks handing out campaign brochures for reformist candidates.
Many of us were supposed to be studying for college entrance exams, but we felt that “elections were more important.” I recall very well reading the campaign brochure which contained the reform movement’s promises: a program of radical reforms spanning from reforming the press law and curtailing the powers of the Guardian Council to limiting the powers of the special court for the clergy and the supreme council for the cultural revolution.
Finally the election day came, and what the reformists wanted happened. I still remember the headline of Sobh-e Emrooz newspaper on the day after the elections: “Long Live the Iranian Nation.” Aria’s headline was: “Iran Roared, Khatami Smiled, Reforms Receive Vote of Confidence.”
But what did the reformists do with all that trust and support?
Two days before the heart-wrenching assassination attempt on his life, the ideologue of the reform movement, Saeed Hajjarian said at Isfahan University that everything is now ready for reforms. Until now we told the people the Majlis is derailing reforms, now we have taken over the Majlis [paraphrased]. Two days later, Hajjarian’s assassination became a symbol of the will to resist reforms. Today everyone knows the fate of the press law reform. Not a single reform legislation was successful: not the press bill, not the political parties bill, not the political crimes bill, not the anti-torture bill, etc
None of the promises made by reformist candidates to further the project of democratization in Iran bore fruit. Why not? A majority of reformists cite the determined resistance of main centers of power and supervisory institutions as the main hindrance to reforms. Very well. Several years have now passed since then and a fresh round of elections are approaching. What has changed since then? How do reformists propose to realize their promises this time? Has something new happened to entice centers of power to limit their influence even within the confines laid down by the current Consitution? Have supervisory institutions agreed to relinquish their priviledged role? If not, then how are reformist policies to be implemented? How are social and political freedoms to be institutionalized?
The central question still remains: Are democratic reforms toward institutionalization of self-determination and human rights possible within the current legal and operational framework? If yes, how? If not, then what is it that reformists want to reform? Would it not be better for reformists to honestly accept – that is, if they are allowed to – that, at best, they will play the role of a moderate faction in the Islamic Republic? If there are no convincing answers to these questions, one can conclude that “moderation” is now finding its definition between the sentences of the “coalition”: abandonment of the reform project and transition to the role of moderate faction.
