One characteristic of the ninth government (since 1979) in Iran is its considerable cooperation with the Passdaran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in political, economic and national security realms.
More than just a military institution, the IRGC now occupies a privileged position in many big economic projects; in national security, it rivals the intelligence ministry; and its former members occupy key posts in the executive branch.
In the economic realm, as senior IRGC officials have noted, this military institution is managing “heavy” and giant economic projects (such as building dams, irrigation networks, gas and oil pipelines, ports, roads, etc.). It also has become involved in manufacturing electronic and communications devices. The direct and indirect participation of the former and current IRGC commanders is accompanied by very considerable financial and other advantages that are not accessible to private companies and economic firms.
In the national security realm, intelligence minister Mohseni Ezhei announced recently –following the arrest of spies by IRGC’ intelligence arm – that “the intelligence apparatus in the ninth administration is very well connected in all areas… there are little tasks in which the intelligence ministry and Revolutionary Guards and security forces’ intelligence arms are no cooperating in.” The intelligence minister’s emphasis on the close connection of the intelligence apparatus in the “ninth administration” highlights the earlier point brought up in this piece.
The presence of former IRGC commanders in the executive branch, as indicated by backgrounds of many of ministers and senior officials in the ninth administration, is undeniable. As one instance, consider the remarks of General Ali Reza Afshar, former political deputy at the interior ministry, who noted in an interview this week that the administration and IRGC have very good relations, adding, “Currently the number of Revolutionary Guards commanders who work in the ninth administration is not low and in these circumstances the Revolutionary Guards counts on the administration because there is a great deal of cooperation between them.”
This intertwining of political, economic, military and national security power has placed the IRGC in a very privileged position. Obviously, this places the institution’s top policy-makers in a special position by giving them a influential potential. This potential, if not unique, must be regarded as rare in the context of democratization in Iran.
It is undeniable that the aforementioned ideological and power connections (political, economic, national security and intelligence) have led to the emergence of a new class in the Islamic Republic. Any kind of analysis of the power structure and general political conditions in Iran would be extremely faulty if it does not take this new class into account.
It is obvious that the “new class” that has emerged in Iran cannot tolerate freedom of speech and press, which will lead to revelation of this class’s activities and benefits. This class is seeking advantages not just in political and cultural realms, but also economic and social realms.
It is undeniable that the activities of the democracy- and human rights-seeking movements in Iran are closely connected with the present configuration of political forces in government. In other words, the dominance of militarists on economic and political veins has taken away the possibility of political, social, cultural and even economic activity by civil society activists in Iran. As a result, attempts to break the monopoly of militarists on the political structure are of fundamental priority to change the direction of the nation. This is a reality that must seriously be considered by political and social activists in Iran, particularly in election season.
