In my opinion, if we want to understand the root cause of Iran’s current problems, we ‎have to glance back at the events following the 1979 Revolution, which, in my analysis, ‎had two contradictory trends. One played a significant role in shaping Iran’s current ‎situation. I begin this piece with the first term of Mr. Rafsanjani’s presidency. ‎

Those who are endowed with a good memory recall that Mr. Rafsanjani in 1989 took ‎over the executive branch with a mandate to reconstruct the country after a devastating ‎eight-year war. He also promised to reform the economy with the World Bank’s ‎guidance, open up the country’s cultural atmosphere, normalize Iran’s foreign relations, ‎and institute principles of scientific management in place of religious management. ‎

These goals were interconnected and formed a so-called "package." ‎

In reality, this package was none other than following the Western model of ‎development. As such, it alienated the leftist camp and marked a departure from some of ‎the 1979 Revolution’s ideals. ‎

The alienation of the leftist camp, to which I myself belonged, did not matter much, as ‎leftists did not hold much power anyway. ‎

Mr. Rafsanjani’s main problem was with the Hezbollahis, or the “pious,” committed ‎forces who quickly realized that Mr. Rafsanjani’s “scientific” management does not leave ‎a place for them or their ideology. ‎

I think Mr. Rafsanjani did not intend to alienate the Hezbollah. In fact, he preferred that ‎the Hezbollah stayed in power, after a little moderation of a radical ideology. Mr. ‎Rafsanjani’s program, however, was to institute scientific management, and that did not ‎leave any place for the Hezbollahi forces. ‎

The Hezbollah, however, regarded itself as the bastion of the revolution and pursued its ‎own interests, so it was natural that it would not tolerate Mr. Rafsanjani’s package and ‎direction of change. ‎

In fact, if we want to be impartial, the Islamic Republic had been able to withstand all ‎kinds of foreign and domestic challenges precisely by relying on Hezbollah’s ‎determination and ideological ferocity. Therefore, it was not easy for the regime to push ‎Hezbollah aside. In fact such a move may have even brought about a tactical suicide, ‎depriving the regime of its main bastion of support. ‎

Losing Hezbollah’s support meant that Mr. Rafsanjani needed to rely on the support of an ‎alternative social base, which was emerging in the form of a new and progressive middle ‎class, something that Mr. Rafsanjani did not have a good grasp of and did not try to bring ‎about. At least, his efforts to do so were too little and too late. ‎

On the one hand, Mr. Rafsanjani did not want to lose Hezbollah, while on the other, he ‎was not able to create a stable social class to replace it. ‎

For this reason, despite his accomplishments in his first term in office, Mr. Rafsanjani ‎retreated during his second term and essentially abandoned his development program in a ‎bid not to alienate the Hezbollah any further. ‎

Meanwhile, in order to stand up to Rafsanjani and discredit his programs, Hezbollah ‎began propagating its own ideology more vehemently and strengthened its organizational ‎capacities. ‎

Mr. Rafsanjani finished his second term in office while a disorganized new middle class ‎was dispersed across the country, whereas an organized and institutionalized Hezbollah ‎had emerged more powerful than ever before. ‎

Rafsanjani’s disorganized supporters went head to head with Hezbollah’s organized ‎forces during the 1997 presidential election, in which the former camp won the battle, ‎owing to its sheer numbers. But this was only the beginning of a much larger and more ‎dangerous game that followed, which I will get to in my next article. ‎