I think US policy has now changed about Iran, while turning into an uncertain and ‎complex issue. And this complexity is going to make us Iranians even more confused ‎than before, channeling us into contradictory analysis based on international conspiracy ‎theories.‎

The reason I am convinced that US policy towards Iran is becoming more complex is last ‎week’s report by the US intelligence community on Iran (the National Intelligence ‎Estimate on Iran), which is in contradiction to the normal and official developments ‎between the two countries.‎

The timing of the publication of the US intelligence report, and its contents, is still a ‎mystery to me. Contrary to the view of the Iranian government and much of the ‎international media, I do not view this report and its intricate and inconsistent logic, to ‎contribute towards a rapid and straightforward resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue, while at ‎the same time acknowledging that I do not understand it either. ‎

The warm and even fiery embrace of members of Ahmadinejad’s government of this ‎report, which talks of the existence of a military nuclear program in Iran until the year ‎‎2003, does not surprise me because Iranian authorities in general strive to make ‎propaganda of any issue without looking into the contents or the depth of the issue. But ‎what has baffled me is the way international media is dealing with the report. These ‎media are looking at this intelligence report as if it was prepared by some international ‎organization rather the Bush administration. I believe that Mr. Bush was aware of the ‎contents of this report a long time ago and thus could have prevented its open publication, ‎or postponed it, or even requested that it be published with different language.‎

But Mr. Bush did not take any of these measures and allowed the key parts of the report ‎be declassified at a time when he himself was busy trying to convince the members of the ‎UN Security Council to agree to another round of even more harsher sanctions against ‎Iran by opening the report with the sentence that “Iran suspended its nuclear weapons ‎program in 2003.” In my opinion, if the intelligence report had not begun with this ‎sentence and this message was buried in its contents, the impact of the report would have ‎been much less. This opening distracted journalists and analysts from reading the rest of ‎report, and thus attempt to uncover the meaning of the contents of many of its scenarios, ‎including its express and implicit recommendations. ‎

But it appears that the preparers of the report and the US government desired to launch ‎the report with the news that Iran had suspended its military nuclear program a few years ‎ago. Why? And while only the preparers and Mr. Bush know the real reasons for this, we ‎can and wish to contemplate in this regard. ‎

It appears that as he repeatedly stressed, Mr. Bush has desired to resolve Iran’s nuclear ‎crises through a non-military approach and believes that international pressure will ‎eventually force Iran to surrender.‎

Despite this, the possibility of an imminent US military attack on Iran was so widespread ‎around the world that even some of the prominent Iranian political leaders believed that ‎an attack was assured, imminent and irreversible. Even repeated American denials of this ‎were not effective. ‎

It is possible that the US government began the report with the message that Iran had ‎suspended its military nuclear program because it wants to show its dedication to pursue ‎the current approach against Iran and negate the immediate use of military so as to ‎remove the international suspicion that an attack was imminent.‎

Perhaps the trend that began at the Annapolis conference has convinced the US ‎government that this process would eventually lead to the isolation of Iran and its ‎surrender, and so it would be best to publish the definitive aspect of Iran’s nuclear ‎program, instead of emphasizing the vague threats, and suspicious and unfounded aspects ‎of the program. This would regain the lost confidence of the intelligence services, which ‎came about because of the Iraq issue, while at the same time mobilize the international ‎community for greater pressure on Iran based on a more conservative yet definitive and ‎acceptable estimate of Iran’s nuclear agenda. ‎

Perhaps beginning the report with the suspension issue is to emphasize the suspension of ‎the military aspect of the program so that it can challenge Iran’s claim that its program is ‎peaceful, while at the same time creating the basis for increasing the pressure on Iran to ‎expose the secret details of the program to the world.‎

At the same time, the publication of the report has negated an immediate military strike ‎against Iran, while still keeping that option open for the future.‎

Therefore, I believe that the process of bringing Iran to its knees has now entered a more ‎intricate and perhaps even more surprising phase. It is our duty to try to understand this ‎complexity and thus not heed to the temptation of succumbing to the typical and ‎psychological Iranian tendencies that push us towards conspiracy theories.‎