The group interrogation of a number of Iranian journalists returning from a workshop in Holland contains a number of distinct messages that, viewed together, provide an accurate picture of the relationship between Iran’s government and its people.
First, the interrogation at the airport and the confiscation of journalists’ personal belongings points to the Ministry of Intelligence’s efforts at creating an atmosphere of insecurity, and intimidating journalists and civil society activists. This technique of increasing the cost of conducting any normal journalistic or civil society activity has been implemented repeatedly in the past few years, especially after coming to power of hardline president Ahmadinejad. While there are no precise statistics at hand, the intelligence system is in effect pursuing the policy of instilling terror and fear among civil society activists. This has led to the immigration of many journalists and the occupational change that many others inside the country have made by taking up other jobs as their profession.
Secondly, some believe that such interrogations are carried out for the purpose of “gathering intelligence.” Unfortunately the intelligence system, because of its inability to understand and analyze the deeply entrenched processes that define social relations, uses the most primitive techniques to gather intelligence. It is for this reason that the satirical story of the rabbit that confesses (under torture and pressure) that it is a bear has become a household story in Iran.
This is a sad issue, but it is true. I have always rejected the idea of gathering intelligence through torture and intimidation. The lack confidence that promotes this type of intelligence gathering is very dangerous for the security apparatus while also endangering the security of the citizens of this country. The kind of confessions and intelligence that is extracted through such means is usually ambiguous, and mostly false. Even though during president Khatami’s presidential term, this practice was stopped at the Ministry of Intelligence, other intelligence and security bureaus known as the “parallel agencies”, continued the practices. After Ahmadinejad took the presidency, leading to the consolidation of security organizations into one body, the Ministry is again back to its old tricks. There were many situations where the Ministry of Intelligence gave a clean slate to individuals who had been accused of security or intelligence violations by the parallel security/intelligence agencies. The judiciary officials that requested such information from the Ministry, however, were still directed elsewhere, even when the Ministry had cleared a person. The best example for this is what happened to Akbar Ganji. He was eventually given a mere 6 month sentence by Judge Bakhshi. This led to the resignation of the judge, indicating that those who interrogated and intimated, could also undermine the independence of a judge.
Thirdly, weak intelligence and the inability to properly analyze situations bring about the death of any intelligence apparatus. Under such circumstances the intelligence system is constantly either assuming a defensive posture or attacking mindlessly, inflicting costs on citizens from the most unexpected avenues.
Fourthly, the weakness of the intelligence system has pushed it hurriedly into the direction of “conspiracy theories.” Conspiracy theories are the opiates that have dominated the operation of the intelligence system in the past few years. The domination of these theories is so overwhelming that the intelligence system cannot any longer realize that it is actually weakening itself by following these vicious circles, and also weakening the nation by intimidating civil society activists, who are the backbones of the country.
Finally, and most importantly, in the course of the trials that became known as the trials of web-bloggers and journalists, I was among the journalists who paid a visit to the head of Iran’s judiciary 2 years ago. The judiciary tsar Ayatollah Shahrudi showed us images from the Internet where the heads of some the country’s religious leaders had been superimposed on bodies of other people in compromising situations. We were appalled and I made it clear that we had not done that. My colleagues too explained that none of us had been detained for those repulsive images, and the explanations that we provided proved instructive to him. That incident demonstrated how easily it is for the intelligence personnel to mislead senior decision-makers of the country simply because of their own tunnel vision and dogmatic views of the world. This example may also demonstrate that how and through what mechanisms Ayatollah Khamenei, the regime’s supreme leader, is convinced that “foreign hands” are threatening the traditional culture of the land, or that the Internet is an “enemy.” The real question though is, how was this analysis and conclusion reached?
