While it may appear that a legal, constitutional process and forum has been tasked to probe the uproar over the June 12 election results, one should note that the Guardian Council is not an independent or even a semi-independent body. This is yet another appointed government body in Iran’s Islamic system whose 12 members are half appointed by the supreme leader ayatollah Khamenei and the other half by the national assembly, the Majlis. Its function is to ensure that constitutional provisions are not violated and that the laws passed by the Majlis remain within the confines of Islam, as interpreted by it. The Council is also responsible for supervising national elections, including the recent presidential race of June 12, 2009, and looking into any irregularities. According to the election law, the Council has 3 days to certify the elections or announce its problems.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s choice of the Guardian’s Council is indicative of what may emerge at the end of the forum’s “investigation”. This is a very conservative body whose decisions in the past have one premise which is the support of the leadership of the Islamic system and its components. Khamenei did have other choices to look into the fraud allegations such as the Expediency Council, or the creation of a new body under the supervision of a more impartial person, but he chose to direct the problem to the Council. Furthermore, even in the published text regarding his instructions to the Council to investigate the election complaints, Khamenei has lauded the elections, not criticized it, setting the direction for the Council’s investigation.

And since Khamenei has already aired a congratulatory message regarding the elections, calling it a “divine blessing”, does one really expect the Council to publicly go against him? One must remember that Khamenei may by title and on paper be above party or faction politics, but in reality, as his record shows, he has been very supportive of the current president, and the power faction he represents.

But by announcing that the Council should look into the “issues”, Khamenei is really preparing the ground for further suppression of the reformists and other factions that have emerged to oppose his presidential choice, i.e. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The likely scenario to emerge from the “investigation” of the Guardian Council is that election results would be confirmed, albeit with some alternations in statistics and numbers. But more importantly, the final statement by the Council would also mean to be the signal for the end of all debate on the protests, and the beginning of very harsh crackdown on whoever dares to express or display any rejection of the Council’s investigation, or the results of the election. And if Khamenei himself follows up on the final Council report, which he is likely to do if protests continue, then those who still question the Council and Khamenei’s confirmation and perhaps even calls for calmness, will be standing up against the regime, as the supporters of Khamenei interpret such events. So even individuals like Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Karoubi will be forced to look the other way. But the divisions between “khodi” (those with us) and the “gheyre-khodi” (those not with us) will have been redefined, if not already complete.

As far as the international community and its concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are concerned, one should bear in mind that the nuclear strategy is ayatollah Khamenei’s prerogative, so the name of the president in Iran should not make a difference in this regard. Even Mousavi has not said that he is against Iran’s current nuclear or centrifuge policy - despite the three UN Security Council resolutions calling for its suspension - although he has said that he is against the international pressure and tension on Iran created by Ahmadinejad’s administration. Recent history in the Islamic Republic has shown that whenever liberals or moderates are in power, radical policy changes do not succeed or at the least are not approved by the veto-wielding institutions of the country. This is what happened during Khatami’s years, despite all the good intentions. An example of this is opening up a dialog with the US. During Khatami’s administration, no one even dared to publicly talk about it, but when Ahmadinejad came to office, and the atmosphere changed, the taboo broke and such talk soon became part of a normal debate. In the same light, it is easier for the regime to allow Ahmadinejad to talk with the US, rather than allow the moderates to do so, because the latter is suspect and not trustworthy. And if the goal of the international community is to change Iran’s nuclear policy, a weak moderate government that is not wholly supported by the leader, will not be in a position to renegotiate the nuclear policy with the leader. A hardline government, on the other hand, has more credibility and can, especially if greater pressure, or threats of greater impending international pressure, appear on the horizon. For the US, it would be more difficult to gather the international coalition to pressure the Iranian regime should Mousavi be in saddle in Tehran as he will most certainly oblige to engage in time-delaying talks with the West, the IAEA, he will not threaten Israel, or deny the Holocaust, presenting a much more human and moderate face for the clerics pulling the strings from behind. But that is all it will be: just a face.

With Ahmadinejad in the presidential palace in Tehran, it is easier to move rapidly from talks to pressure, as the record for talks and compromise has already been set. So if the US is going to be returning to the UN Security Council, or Secretary Clinton starting a new wave of shuttle diplomacy with America’s European allies for new sanctions and pressure - albeit after 2009 as set by President Obama - then Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric as president may actually be a blessing.