Rudi Matthee is UNIDEL distinguished professor of Middle Eastern history with a research focus on early modern Iran and the Persian Gulf.  He has written two award-winning books, “The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver," and “The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History,” which received the ISIS Sa'idi Sirjani Book Award and MESA’s 2006 Albert Hourani Award. He has co-edited, with Nikki Keddie,“Iran and the Surrounding World, Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics.” His forthcoming book is titled “Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan." In 2008, a series of his articles was published in Iran as a book titled Eghtesad va Siyasat dar `Asr-e Safavi, translated by Hasan Zandieh.

Here is an exclusive interview with Rooz:

Rooz: You have written two books on Iran and have edited several others. What made you interested in the Middle East, particularly Iran?  

Rudee Matthee (Matthee): My interest in the Middle East goes back to high school in Holland. I attended gymnasium “classical” high school, where I learned Latin and Greek. Reading Greek authors such as Herodotus, Xenophon and Aeschylus, I developed an interest in pre-Islamic Iran. I quickly learned that a degree in such a field might not lead to a paid profession, however, so I opted for the Islamic Middle East and ended up learning Arabic and Persian, and studying history and poetry. After my BA I lived in Iran for one year and later spent two years in Egypt. I ultimately chose to focus on Iran as the more intriguing part of the Middle East. There are several reasons for my fascination with Iran. One is the Iranian esthetic sensibility, the never-ending ability to create beauty out of chaos. The ultimate expression of this is of course Persian poetry. The same sensibility comes through in the bagh, a miniature paradise, filled with flowers and with a pond, howz, in the middle, a refuge from the stark, menacing desert surrounding it.  One sees it in everyday life as well. A poor guy with nine pomegranates to sell will not just throw them into a box; instead he builds a nice pyramid to make things look attractive. Underneath it all is a philosophical approach to life expressed in the endless interplay between outward appearance and essence, the zahir and the batin, both of which are important in Iranian culture. All this gives drama and depth to Iranian culture.    

Rooz: How was your stay in Tehran as an exchange student during the Shah’s regime? Were you treated well?

Matthee: Initially I encountered many problems due to a lack of organization on the part of Iranian officials, a labyrinthine bureaucracy, and the elusiveness of ta’arof, to which I wasn’t used as a Dutchman. In a clear attempt to isolate foreign students, the Iranian authorities placed me at the Daneshgah-e Sepahiyan-e Enqelab, the University where the cadres of the White Revolution were trained, located 40 km outside of Tehran, where I had little contact with ordinary Iranians. It took me months and great effort before I was finally able to move to Tehran, and only during the second part of my stay did I come to enjoy Iran and all it has to offer. Traveling the country from Tabriz and Mashhad to Zahedan and Bandar Abbas, away from the frenzy of Tehran, also gave me a different perspective on the country and its history.

Rooz: You are a Safavid specialist and have written extensively on all aspects of that period, how do you compare the period to today?

Matthee: It is always risky to compare periods that are so far apart and so different. The one obvious comparison one could make is the role of the clergy in the later Safavid period. Led by Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, a dour dogmatist, the ulama focused on the external aspects of the faith and came to play an increasingly important role in politics, especially under the pious and gullible Shah Soltan Hossein. With their growing intolerance of anyone who did not adhere to Twelver-Shi`ism, they alienated Iran’s non-Shi’i inhabitants, undermining the coherence of the Safavid polity and hastening its demise.     

Rooz: You say that the Iranian Revolution was bound to happen.  Why do you come to this conclusion? 

Matthee: Living in Iran in 1976-77, it was clear to me that something was going to happen. The spiraling inflation, the crush of shallow modernization, the megalomania of a regime boasting about the imminent Great Civilization while rampant corruption and absurdities such as changing the calendar overnight sapped its legitimacy—it simply couldn’t last. The Shah’s policies had alienated Iran’s traditional classes while raising the material expectations of the new middle classes without buying their loyalty by way of greater political freedom. But until Khomeini took the lead and the unrest took on a religious coloring, mobilizing the potent arsenal of Shi`i symbols—the martyrdom of Hussein, the struggle for justice—I had no idea what form the massive popular frustration would take. No one did. .

Rooz: You have been to Iran several times in the past decade and have even lectured at Shiraz University.   If they invited you today, will you go?  If not, why not?  

Matthee: Right now, following the events of the summer, the fraudulent elections and the harsh response to the protest movement that followed, I would not accept an official invitation. I think foreign scholars at this point should not go to Iran at the invitation of the regime out of solidarity with the Iranian people. Besides, the authorities lately have been behaving so erratically with legitimate scholars, mostly Iranian-Americans, locking them up on trumped up charges, that for the first time I would be reluctant to go anyway. I never felt this way, and especially under the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami I thought visiting the country and interacting with colleagues in Iran might actually help create a more open environment.

Rooz: Why do you think they are arresting and brutalizing so many people, especially some of Iran's intellectuals and learned men and women? 

Matthee: It’s clearly an attempt to nip the popular opposition in the bud through sheer force and intimidation. The current rulers know what happened to the Shah and how he fell. The Shah was a dictator but he was also loath to spill blood, arguing that a king who kills loses legitimacy with his people.  So when the Revolution came he lacked the personality and the will to use the kind of brutal force that might have quashed the opposition. Besides, the Shah built a house of cards without any loyal constituency. The current rulers have learned from this; they have championed the underprivileged, who have benefited from their policies and who continue to be their defenders. Unlike the previous elites, who packed up and decamped to the West when the house crumbled, the current rulers have nowhere to go. So they will do anything to hang on to power. They target intellectuals because they believe that these are the driving forces behind what they dread most, a “velvet” revolution, a creeping reform movement that will undermine the Islamic Republic from within.   

Rooz: As a historian, are you hopeful for Iran?

Matthee: Throughout its history, Iran has known little else than tyrannical government. Yet it also has a long tradition of popular resistance to abusive rulers inspired by the imperative of justice. Justice indeed is the pivotal concept in the country’s political vocabulary, going back to the Achaemenids. It includes the accountability of government by way of a social contract with the people. Governments historically have violated this contract at their own peril, creating a dangerous chasm between dawlat and mellat. In the last hundred years Iran has gone through periodic popular upheaval, at a rate of once every twenty-five years, from the Constitutional Revolution to the Rise of Reza Shah, to the Mossadegh period to the Islamic Revolution. If we follow that cycle, a popular movement was overdue. We are now witnessing the unfolding of one, even if no one knows where it will lead. On balance, I am optimistic. I am especially heartened by the courageous role women are playing in the ongoing protest. This government has had thirty years to entrench itself. It has lost its legitimacy, however and thus can only survive through force and repression. And since a totalitarian government is unthinkable in the Iranian context, it is bound to fall.