In an exclusive interview with Rooz, political analyst Sadegh Zibakalam calls the eight ‎Majlis elections a “show,” and insists that “this Majlis must be more obedient than the ‎Seventh Majlis.” Below is the text of this interview. ‎

Rooz (R): Mr. Zibakalam, what is your analysis of the oversight committees’ handling of ‎the qualification process and the mass disqualification of candidates?‎

Sadegh Zibakalam (SZ): I think that these disqualifications were fully predictable. In ‎any case, the right wing has consolidated its power following the 2005 presidential ‎election and naturally does not want a Majlis which has an opposing independent faction ‎that can cause trouble for the right wing. ‎

R: Mr. Zibakalam, what can reformists do right now? What strategy can they follow? ‎

SZ: This is a very difficult question. Let’s assume that a miracle happens right now and ‎every single reformist candidate is qualified to run for a seat. This begs the question, ‎even if we imagine that 100 or even 200 reformist candidates win seats in the eight ‎Majlis, what can they do beyond what was done in the sixth Majlis (2000-2004)? ‎

R: Well, if reformists invite you, as a political analyst, to analyze their eight-year ‎performance during the reform movement, what will you point out to them?‎

SZ: I think reformists had two fundamental problems. One, they lacked a coherent, ‎orderly, transparent, and realistic program to push reforms through the system. In other ‎words, the reformists had no policy or program showing how they intended to push and ‎continue reforms. The second fundamental problem was that the reformists ‎simultaneously took on ayatollahs Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani. But that was not ‎necessary: they could have maintained better relations with the supreme leader and not ‎confronted Hashemi Rafsanjani. ‎

R: Well, now that the dichotomy of Ahmadinejad-Hashemi has emerged, can’t ‎reformists use Hashemi to advance their goals? ‎

SZ: I think reformists came to Hashemi when it was too late. If you recall, in the second ‎round of the 2005 presidential election, when Mr. Hashemi was competing against Mr. ‎Ahmadinejad, the reformists defended Mr. Hashemi. But before defending Hashemi, ‎they should have examined the issue of whether their prior attacks on Mr. Hashemi (in ‎‎1999-2000) were called for or not. In any case, now that a dichotomy has emerged, with ‎hardliners on the one side and Mr. Hashemi and others on the other, the reformists will ‎naturally help to strengthen Hashemi, Karoubi and Khatami against hardliners. ‎

R: Given all of these considerations, what should reformists do in the eight Majlis ‎elections?‎

SZ: Reformists have no choice other than to back the minimal number of candidates they ‎have running and help them enter the Majlis. ‎