
Sara Samavati
The following are the excerpts of an interview with Ibrahim Yazdi, the veteran politician and leader of the moderate Iran Freedom Movement in Iran.
Rooz (R): Dr Yazdi, does the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM) have a specific plan for the forthcoming elections in the country?
Ibrahim Yazdi (IY): The plan that the IFM has for the eight Majlis (Parliament) elections has two aspects: presence and participation. The first one involves the use of opportunities and elections atmosphere to express our views and inform the public of political –legal issues, particularly about free, healthy and fair elections as is understood by international standards. Regarding participation, or not participation, it is still too early to say. If the behavior of the rulers, including the Guardians Council (which oversees all elections in Iran), does not change, then we will most likely not participate in the elections.
R: Everywhere there is talk of a grand coalition among reformers. What do you think about this?
IY: Reformers close to the regime have been active in this regard. It is not still clear how successful they will be in accomplishing this goal. During the last presidential elections in 2005, reformers could not agree on a single candidate, and so their votes were spread out. During the forthcoming parliamentary elections too, if they do not succeed in agreeing on a joint list of candidates - aside from the problems that may come because their candidates may be disqualified by the authorities - there is serious doubt about their success.
R: Do you think IFM will succeed in get its candidates approved this time?
IY: If the current oppressive and violent policies of the regime against IFM continue, and the security forces continue their illegal activities they have been engaged in, and the decision makers create barriers for the IFM, which is how they do things, our candidates will most certainly be disqualified.
R: What non-government barriers exist for IFM joining the larger coalition of groups known as the national-religious forces?
IY: Two barriers exist: A group of reformists still view the IFM and other national-religious groups as “outsiders”. It is true that more recently there have been some serious meetings between the representatives of these groups and some understandings have been attained. But the problem is not limited to this. Some leaders of ruling circles and totalitarian groups have openly said that the sin that reformers committed during the last presidential elections was that they formed a coalition with the IFM and cooperated with them and the national-religious groups. Getting close to the IFM is considered a red line by the regime which should not be crossed. Because of this, some reform groups do not wish to cross these red lines created by the Guardians Council, which prevents cooperation among the reformers. Then there is another obstacle in forming a coalition of the reformers, which is the record of the reformers. Some people believe that when reformers held executive and legislative power, they should have taken more fundamental steps.
R: If the forthcoming elections result in the defeat of the totalitarian forces, do you think reformers will demonstrate a more forceful resolve to solve the problems of the country?
IY: If reformers win the forthcoming eight Majlis elections and gain the majority, it appears that they will be able to provide the needed calls of the public. This is so because their victory would mean the serious and extensive weakening of the totalitarian forces, just as the defeat of these forces along with the reactionary forces during the recent Khobregan (Assembly of Experts) elections demonstrated. Still one should be too optimistic because the structural legal and real obstacles in solving the political, economic, social and cultural problems of our country are deeper than levels that could be solved merely gaining the majority in the Majlis. Political and economic change and development is very gradual in Iran and at times fatiguing. IT requires patience and tact.
R: Are you considering international observation of the elections?
IY: Some progressive groups have thought about this. But such a request should only take place, and would be effective, when reformers completely end their hopes in the change of behavior of the ruling circles. Furthermore, there has to be an agreement or a consensus on this among reformers. Currently, there is no consensus on the issue.
R: What is the most pressing political issue in the country?
IY: The biggest problem is the disregard for the law. Shortcomings and structural and domestic aggressions in law is one thing, but stamping on the rules and the law is another. IN any arrangement, when one party unilaterally ignores some of the provisions of the agreement, it creates a crisis in the relations between the parties. The totalitarian rulers of Iran unilaterally violate the provisions of the constitution. For example, the behavior of the security and revolutionary judiciary groups, particularly the clerics, towards political activists among parties, student movements, workers, teachers, women and even regular criminals whom they call hooligans and gangsters, is in most cases in violation of the constitution, international law and specific laws. They are even against prudence and the interests of the country. When workers stage demonstrations to receive their unpaid wages, or teachers strike to get their rights, the normal response across the world is to talk to their representatives to reach an agreement. In Iran however, what follows are arrests, trials and the dismissals or social deprivations.
R: What is the outlook for the forthcoming elections?
IY: The results of the elections cannot be predicted, as are other developments in Iran. I do not believe that the powerful and totalitarian rulers administering the elections have changed or will change their behavior. If they continue their old practices, then the results are predictable. Not only will there be an even greater distance between the government and the public, but there will also be deeper divisions among the reformers who are close to the regime and some of the institutions of the state.


