Reza Alijani, who is regarded as a nationalist-religious figure, speaks to Rooz about ‎center-periphery changes among right wing groups, noting that “the hierarchy among ‎forces in this camp has radically changed.” Below is the text of this interview. ‎

Rooz (R): Given that the right wing camp is composed today of three pre-revolution, ‎revolutionary, and war-time generations, what developments in your opinion, have taken ‎place in the leadership of this camp? ‎

Reza Alijani (RA): Evidence shows that at present the center and the periphery have ‎changed places among right wing groups. In other words, we witness that the hierarchy ‎of power and also the source of authority in the right wing has changed in a way. In the ‎initial years after the revolution, or during the first decade of the new regime, clerics and ‎experienced politicians who were close to the supreme leader were present at the top tier ‎of the right wing camp. There was a group of technocrats around them who were mostly ‎absorbed into the movement before the revolution and held key posts in the regime, such ‎as ministerial and general manager positions, and so on. Present at the third tier were ‎individuals and youngsters who were active at the Revolutionary Guards or Jahad ‎organizations. In other words, that was the hierarchy of power. ‎

R: When did that hierarchy of power begin changing? ‎

RA: I suppose that the place of first and third tiers gradually changed beginning with the ‎years following the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Young forces from military and security ‎organizations that previously constituted the regime’s infantry gradually replaced ‎experienced and older people. They were promoted to higher positions. Yesterday’s ‎soldiers became today’s commanders. ‎

R: What are the positions of these camps toward democracy and democratic trends? ‎Where do they disagree on these issues? ‎

RA: These three camps are generally in agreement in their anti-democratic stances. ‎However, since Khatami’s presidency ended, the center-periphery change that I referred ‎to gradually gained momentum. The first two tiers were somewhat weekend by their ‎confrontation of the reform movement, but the third tier suddenly began moving with fast ‎momentum and, because of its political and security efficiency, grabbed a foothold. In ‎other words, this movement gradually grew without classical reliance on a specific ‎economic class and without any political or religious credentials – although one has to ‎note that it enjoyed direct and indirect support of the other two camps in confronting the ‎reform movement. ‎

R: How do you see the present condition of the third tier? ‎

RA: The third tier forces who are now in the first tier, from an age point of view, we ‎have to say are middle-aged, and generally have military and security backgrounds. For a ‎long time, they were moving behind the first tier, especially behind prominent clerics and ‎politicians in the first tier. But this tier is now at the forefront, and this very promotion ‎and arrogance and even criticism, it has at times even harshly confronted leaders of the ‎first tier. But this tier’s immoderate behavior toward other camps, in addition to its ‎severe incompetence in management of social, economic and foreign policy affairs, has ‎severely isolated and to some extent destroyed the future of this camp. In other words, it ‎can be said that the radical right in Iran has reached its peak and is now in descent. ‎

R: How will the other two right wing tiers treat and behave toward the third tier? ‎

RA: It can be predicted that the other two tiers, because they are faced with general ‎public discontent resulting from the severe mismanagement of the third tier in various ‎sectors, and witness the public’s discontent, would very soon sacrifice this movement. In ‎the eighth Majlis elections we witnessed that many of the right wing’s internal camps ‎were very critical of the administration – albeit very late and to their own advantage – ‎and we will see the results of this new power shift in the eighth Majlis. The Majlis ‎speaker Mr. Larijani is very pragmatist but has sharper tongue in criticizing the right ‎wing camp. In the next presidential election internal disputes in the right wing camp ‎would be more forceful. ‎

R: How do you see the right wing’s future in light of this? ‎

RA: In the future, the right wing will experience more severe factional defections and ‎conflicts. But a portion of this camp, in my opinion, has become a little modernized and ‎can move toward formation of a political party, albeit with a right-wing ideology. But ‎the more important and in my opinion the central tier of this camp will backtrack in face ‎of the future’s hopeless outlook, although it will continue to act as an invisible, behind-‎the-scenes force. ‎