Emadeddin Baghi is taken to the Evin Prison; the verdicts of three oppressed Amir Kabir ‎students were upheld by the appellate court; Hadi Ghabel was sent to prison in Ghom; ‎Shirin Ebadi was threatened with death; women’s rights activist, Nasrin Afzali, is ‎sentenced to lashes...‎

These events have taken place in the past two weeks alone. Can one talk about the ‎phenomenon of “increasing suppression” in the country’s political atmosphere? The ‎answer, perhaps, is yes. It seems as if the Iranian civil society will experience more ‎hardships in the present year than the previous one. ‎

One can predict that we will witness increasing suppression of civil society activists in ‎the new year for two main reasons: first, the increasing weight of international pressure ‎following the passage of the third U.N. resolution against Iran; and secondly, the ‎increasing and uncontrollable rate of inflation. The second reason is not separable from ‎the first. Political pressure and sanctions, and economic pressure on the political regime ‎ruling Iran, will, undoubtedly, influence the Iranian economy. This pressure, in turn, is ‎completed with the Ahmadinejad Administration’s mismanagement of the economy and ‎its counterproductive monetary and financial policies. ‎

The Iranian government, in order to impose its authority and hegemony, has no option ‎but to suppress the civil society, intellectuals and potential and actual dissidents, and to ‎impose increasing pressure on Iranian institutions and human rights organizations, and to ‎suppress unions and public demands. The reason is because the government lacks the ‎democratic culture to incorporate the public’s demands in a soft, tolerable and reasonable ‎manner. The eight Majlis election results demonstrate that a considerable portion of the ‎country’s population, especially in larger cities, view the power structure’s political ‎struggles with silence and from a distance, avoiding direct involvement in its games. ‎

In such circumstances, any kind of official and collective protest, if interpreted as a threat ‎to government’s authority, will be confronted harshly. The harsh suppression of a union ‎protest in a factory in Tehran’s suburb is a perfect example. Obviously, as such protests ‎become more violent and take the shape of citywide rebellions (like the ones we ‎witnessed in the early 1990s in some large cities), they will be more violently and ‎forcefully suppressed. ‎

In addition, we must not forget that this year is an important one for the Ahmadinejad ‎Administration – and its opponents. Ahmadinejad does not want his administration to be ‎portrayed as inept and his policies as ineffective in the months remaining to the ‎presidential election, and powerful government institutions are not willing to relinquish ‎power either. Ahmadinejad’s opponents do not want to miss the opportunity to denounce ‎Ahmadinejad Administration’s poor performance and failed policies. Power struggles ‎will create a more nervous environment in Iran. ‎

What has been said can – unfortunately – mean increasing suppression of critics and ‎opponents. The suppression of political, cultural, and social spheres will assume higher ‎priority for the rulers of Iran. ‎