The increasing influence of military officers in the Iranian government coupled with new ‎ideological characteristics and windfall oil revenues has led to the genesis of a "new class" in ‎Iran. ‎

To appreciate this issue, note the remarks of the former commander of Sepah-e Pasdaran ‎‎[Revolutionary Guards] force Major General Rahim Safavi: "Sepah-e Pasdaran is managing ‎about 1300 projects in various sectors… Building large dams…building 2500 kilometers of ‎pipeline to transport water, gas and oil…developing ports of Shaheed Rajai, Bandar Abbas, and ‎Chabahar; building jetties in Bahregan, Bushehr; building a 150 thousand ton jetty for floaters in ‎Bandar-e Imam Khomeini… are among them" (E'temad Melli 10/2/87 [04/21/08])‎

One must also take into account that these are large and important projects, as one can predict ‎from their description. The Supreme Leader's representative at Sepah-e Pasdaran, Ali Saeedi, ‎openly admitted this point: "Sepah has taken responsibility for completing huge projects, many ‎of which are in national scale and not fitting for other firms and companies." ‎

Involvement in such huge economic projects requires the expansion and empowerment of ‎industrial and engineering firms and companies, which are managed by military officers. This ‎has led to the emergence of an interconnected group of people, with a shared and complimentary ‎ideology, and similar interests and political goals. Gradually, a new class is born - and has been ‎born - which is so powerful that it can manage projects that that other classes (with social layers) ‎are unable to manage. ‎

The reliance of the new class on oil revenues is undeniable. This new class, born from the ‎bosom of a political-ideological regime, relies on exclusive oil revenues. In a complementary ‎and dialectic relationship, an authoritarian and ideological government generates and defines a ‎class that, more than other social layers, strives to preserve that government's foundations. On ‎the other hand, the new class pays maximum effort to the preservation and sustenance of the ‎power structure, because its power and prosperity is conditioned on it. The same story applies to ‎both sides of the coin. ‎

The new class is sensitive toward the public's demand for freedom. This class will never agree ‎with freedom - specially political freedom - in its full meaning. The new class does not just ‎oppose granting freedom of speech and freedom of expression to criticize the official ideology. ‎The new class instinctively believes that it has ownership over all of society's achievements, and ‎that this ownership is threatened with every criticism of the political regime. It will strongly ‎react to any kind of criticism it deems threatening to its interests. ‎

Based on the above-mentioned characteristics one can explain developments such as efforts by ‎military officers and their allies to suppress critics and exert ultimate control over electoral ‎proceedings. ‎

It seems like analyzing the Islamic Republic's power structure, as well as preparing and planning ‎mechanisms to advance democratization in Iran, in a way that would be incomplete, incorrect ‎and careless if the ability and essence of this "new class is not taken into account." ‎