‎

Nader Irani ‎

Some believe that the era of maintaining the balance of power among various political ‎factions in Iran ended with the March 14, 2008 parliamentary elections. If that is the ‎case, would former president Mohammad Khatami run in next year’s presidential ‎elections? If the empowerment of moderate conservatives has reached a dead-end in ‎Iran’s current environment, what then awaits the reformists? These are questions we ‎posed to political activist Alireza Rajaei. Read on for his views.‎

Rooz (R): What could have happened if the reformists had not participated in the Majlis ‎elections of March 14, 2008? ‎
Alireza Rajai (AR): Indeed, for some reformists the issue of participation in elections ‎was meaningless, especially those who are viewed to be the “extremists” by right ‎wingers. Other reformist groups decided to participate in order to avoid being dissolved ‎or suspended by participating in a boycott. Therefore, participation in elections was ‎aimed at avoiding the consequences of non-participation, than to affect the balance of ‎power through participation. ‎

R: What were the goals of the ruling faction in these elections? ‎
AR: The elections could be used as a barometer to evaluate the ruling faction, meaning ‎that elections showed that the ruling faction has no respect for principles of free and fair ‎elections. Until the actual elections took place, we could only say that the ruling faction ‎had no respect for laws in allowing or qualifying other candidates to participate in the ‎elections, and that it would only qualify those individuals who it considered had proven ‎themselves. But with the evidence uncovered by reformists since then, there were further ‎and more serious violations in the voting process itself. Therefore, it seems as if the main ‎advantage of participation for reformists is to shield them from future harm arising out of ‎non-participation. We saw that, except in one or two cases, no prominent reformist ‎figures were qualified in all of Iran. ‎

R: Does that mean that the concept of elections – which, according to some, is enshrined ‎in the political philosophy of the Islamic Republic and its Constitution – has lost meaning ‎and nothing is left of it? ‎
AR: Yes, it seems as if this development is taking place. To keep themselves politically ‎active, reformists have to ignore many of the visible violations, because that would ‎eradicate their purpose and ability to mobilize the public. Elections provide reformists ‎with the opportunity to share their message with the public and organize their campaigns. ‎If they want to reveal the election shortcomings in Iran, this is an opportunity to use for ‎that purpose. In the words of a prominent reformist, under the current circumstances all ‎that is left are bad choices and, in a sense, we can say that most of the time, reformists are ‎disarmed. ‎

R: With what you have said about the elections, what will now happen to the reformist ‎camp? Where does the reform camp see itself? ‎
AR: Your question is best answered after next year’s presidential election. It seems that ‎reformists still hope to influence the balance of power by relying on the personal and ‎political capital of prominent figures such as Khatami. Still the way the ruling faction ‎dealt with the March parliamentary elections and its determination not to allow post ‎Khordad 2 events to be repeated (Khordad 2 is a political reference to the unexpected ‎election of reformist Mohammad Khatami to the presidency in 1997) under any ‎circumstances pales the possibility of such an outcome so I do not foresee a fundamental ‎change in the election tactics of the reformists.‎

R: In view of the level of public participation in the March elections, what is the message ‎for the domestic political forces, the regime and the international scene?‎
AR: These elections had two messages: the first is what we call the “political dead-end”, ‎which is becoming more serious with time and as international punitive measures against ‎Iran continue which make the regime more determined to limit the political atmosphere ‎of the country. The other point is that in the international arena, every punitive measure ‎comes along with some incentives. So there is an effort to promote direct talks between ‎the leadership of the regime with the international community. The structure (nature) of ‎the political decision-making apparatus in Iran still possesses the capability to make ‎engage in revolutionary actions. Because of this, the international community is forced to ‎engage in a long-term project to contain such a possibility and thus tire out this energy.‎

R: What do you think is the long-term strategy of the regime regarding the reformists?‎
AR: Look, elimination of reformers was clearly the goal of the regime, as seen in the ‎positions that the leader of Iran took before the elections. Two points came out very ‎clearly in his remarks, which had never been said before. The first was that reformers ‎have absolutely no place in the Islamic Republic (of Iran). This is because these are ‎revisionist forces whereas any group that wants to establish itself and be accepted must ‎sail along the lines of the Principalists or idealogues. The second was that the leader of ‎Iran said that the country was under attack and plots of its enemies and that this would ‎continue for another 20 years. In reality he said that these plots had begun since the death ‎of ayatollah Khomeini (in 1989), which had been confronted and that they could continue ‎for another 20 years. What his words really mean is that the regime has to prepare itself ‎for such animosity. And the basis for such a preparation is unity so that it is free from ‎dealing with domestic conflicts. This appears to be a long-term strategy of the regime. ‎The tangible meaning of this strategy is that reformers and moderates have no place in ‎the Islamic Republic of Iran because they cause internal tension because they do not ‎believe in the fundamental values of the (1979) revolution and also because they create ‎disharmony in the defense strategy against the encroachment of the enemy. So the regime ‎believes that the cause roots for their existence and presence must be removed as much as ‎possible. Under these circumstances there is no future for the reformers.‎

R: As you know the international atmosphere is getting worse. Domestically, the ‎economic, social and political outlook too is deteriorating. Does the regime have the ‎capacity to engage in violent means against the public and prevent free elections next ‎year?‎
AR: If you remember last year when gasoline rationing was implemented by the ‎government, limited riots erupted in the country. These are examples of natural eruptions ‎by the public. But such riots lack any leadership which could organize the demands of the ‎public and direct their actions so in fact they do not turn into any effective political ‎challenge. Furthermore, we have had many such riots in the country since the revolution ‎without any real results. In view of the security responses that follow such events, these ‎riots are immediately contained. So it does not appear that the policies of the Islamic ‎Republic will change because of such events. This issue becomes more evident because ‎of the international confrontation that the regime has poised itself against, which it ‎interprets to be the core issue in its defense of the revolution.‎

R: So is there a chance for Mr. Ahmadinejad to be reinstated as the next president?‎
AR: Yes, unfortunately one may expect that the president will solidify his position as ‎president because none of the other candidates can take charge of the current situation. ‎