‎

Journalist and political activist Ahmad Zeidabadi told a gathering of the members of the ‎Jonbesh-e Mosalman-e Mobarez [“Movement of Combatant Muslims”] opposition group ‎that a state which endangers the security of its citizens can no longer be considered a ‎state, by definition. ‎

Zeidabadi commented on the recent Majlis elections in Iran, noting, “In Iran, rather than ‎being a peaceful tool for a transfer of power and embodiment of the national will, ‎elections have turned into a security problem. The regime cares more about the ‎international aspect of elections, because it prefers that the outside world acknowledge ‎the regime’s legitimacy based on the number of people who participate in voting.” ‎

Zeidabadi claimed that even the issue of who is eligible to vote is ambiguous in Iran: ‎‎“Iran’s population was announced at 70 million and 500 thousand in 1385 (1996), which, ‎if we take the 1.4 percent rate of population growth into account, has grown to ‎somewhere around 71 million and 500 thousand people in 1386 (1997). Based on ‎population figures from 1385 (1996), the under-15 population was 17 million and 700 ‎thousand, and the 15- to 20-year population group was around 8 million and 700 ‎thousand. Iran’s under-18 population is somewhere around 20 million, and when we ‎subtract that from the 70 million, we get something around 50 million people, who are ‎eligible to vote by estimations of statistics experts. Suddenly, however, the number of ‎eligible voters was announced to be 43 million, 7 million less than the actual number, ‎which is not a small discrepency.” ‎

Zeidabadi continued, “In general, the numbers indicate that the overall rate of ‎participation was not appropriate.” ‎

Zeidabadi said in another part of his speech: “The picture of the world that the regime’s ‎officials provide is based on the belief that superpowers, especially America, is going to ‎decline and disintegrate because of the housing crisis, and that Israel too is about to be ‎destroyed; that Iran and its allies have the upper hand in the Middle East such that they ‎can institute their preferred model of Islamic government there. Based on such a ‎worldview, the officials think that they can survive the current crises, such as inflation ‎and high prices.” ‎

‎“However,” Zeidabadi added, “if the supporters of this movement are not able to prove ‎that what they say about the outside world is true, and if the reality of the outside world ‎does not conform to what the regime’s officials say, that will have a significant impact on ‎the political environment, and there is a possibility that the main institutions in charge of ‎decision-making will seriously reform their policies. Also, domestically, such ‎developments can weaken Mr. Ahmadinejad’s position.” ‎

Zeidabadi noted that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s dismal performance is starting to alienate even ‎his closest allies, casting doubt on the probability that he will be reelected for a second ‎term: “The president’s behavior does not follow any sort of order and is only based on a ‎set of personal beliefs regarding complicated issues such as international relations, ‎foreign policy, economics and development.” ‎

Zeidabadi also commented about the present famine, country’s mismanagement and ‎Middle Eastern politics: “Perhaps there is a hidden advantage in these problems and ‎pressures, that being that the crises will force officials to reconsider their policies and ‎adopt more reasonable approaches. I don’t think it is out of the question that the regime ‎will undertake a serious reform of its policies, although that can be very difficult. In the ‎long-run, I am optimistic about Iran’s future, even though we have to continue to tolerate ‎the present condition in order to reach that better position.” ‎