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Following the massive official disqualification of reformist candidates for the March 14, ‎‎2008 Majlis elections in Iran, to the effect that only 70 elections districts out of a total ‎‎200 now have reformist candidates standing for elections, the reformers have announced ‎their latest decision about the elections. The decision implies that they have opted to ‎make a “limited participation” in the elections and “provide candidate lists in the limited ‎districts where competition exists.”‎

The coalition elections board of the reformers justified its decision by reason that it ‎desired to prevent “the tasteless practice of pre-determining more than two thirds of the ‎Majlis seats.” ‎

There is no doubt that stopping the practice of pre-determining two thirds of the Majlis ‎seats prior to elections is a great idea. What is not clear is how participation in the ‎elections under the current circumstances can advance this goal. ‎

During the elections to the previous Majlis (the seventh that began its term in 2004) two ‎thirds of the seats were determined prior to the elections. In response to this, reformers ‎initially campaigned for several weeks against heeding to such elections through public ‎announcements (which culminated in the threat of resignation of 14 cabinet members and ‎‎28 provincial governors). But eventually they took part in the elections. The outcome of ‎this was that a small faction of about 50 pro-reform individuals got into the legislature, ‎but which naturally had no impact on the developments in the country.‎

On the even of the eight Majlis elections on March 14, the disqualifications are even ‎larger in proportion to the previous process. This time too, reformers initially protested ‎the disqualifications, albeit on a much smaller scale and more disparagingly. Now, they ‎have announced that they would participate in the limited election districts where ‎competition is possible. Projection this trend to the future, one may say that in the next ‎elections, if the number of districts that may have reformers is reduced to 40 or even 30, ‎reformers would again, after initial protests and expressions of displeasures, actively ‎participate in the “limited number” of districts where competition is available. ‎

So the real question is this: Where is the red line for this type of open-ended participation ‎in elections? And how far must disqualifications go to conclude that a limit has been ‎reached and so there is no point in presenting lists in the elections?‎

More importantly, if the ruling hardliners are provided the practical assurance that ‎reformist groupings would participate in elections under “any” circumstances and ‎regardless of how many of their candidates are disqualified, then why should the regime ‎be expected to have any constrains in repeating or intensifying their uncompetitive ‎practices in the future?‎

Which country comparable to Iran do we know whose ruling circles “voluntarily” send ‎their rivals to government decision making centers? Especially when these rival groups ‎who are denied the right to participate in elections, can neither organize any social protest ‎nor do they have important media outlets to express their protests, and furthermore, they ‎do not even have the possibility of not participating in the elections…‎

Under the current conditions, nobody has any serious doubts that the eight Majlis (to be ‎formed after March 2008) is lost to the reformers. At best, 40 or 50 of their candidates ‎may get into the legislature but would have no impact on the workings or decisions of the ‎forum.‎

But, instead of spending so much energy on forming a small ineffective faction, there is a ‎better alternative: boycott the uncompetitive elections for the first time and unilaterally ‎withdraw all their candidates from the districts.‎

Such a move which would be costly in the short-run, would at the least create a ‎bargaining lever in the following elections. This would be most beneficial for its ‎participation in the elections because for the first time it would be sending a message to ‎the hardliners to the effect that they must consider the reactions of their competitors when ‎disqualifying their candidates. Otherwise, there is nothing preventing the regime – who ‎have proved that it is very important for them to have at least a minimum presence of ‎reformers for publicity purposes in the controlled elections – from continuing their ‎practices in future elections, or even intensifying them.‎

Groups that support the idea of participating in elections under any conditions, should put ‎themselves in the shoes of their competitors: What must these groups be afraid so that in ‎the next elections they do not disqualify twice as many candidates from the competitive ‎field? If we assure our rivals that our easy removal bears no costs to them, then have we ‎not triggered their rapid extinction?‎