It was the sixth Majlis elections and the cold winter of 2000, that is referred to as the ‎Spring in Iranian politics: the era of flourishing newspapers, “the era of hope for ‎reforms.” In those days, like thousand of other youngsters, with a heart full of hope, I ‎would stand on street corners and crosswalks handing out campaign brochures for ‎reformist candidates. ‎

Many of us were supposed to be studying for college entrance exams, but we felt that ‎‎“elections were more important.” I recall very well reading the campaign brochure which ‎contained the reform movement’s promises: a program of radical reforms spanning from ‎reforming the press law and curtailing the powers of the Guardian Council to limiting the ‎powers of the special court for the clergy and the supreme council for the cultural ‎revolution. ‎

Finally the election day came, and what the reformists wanted happened. I still ‎remember the headline of Sobh-e Emrooz newspaper on the day after the elections: ‎‎“Long Live the Iranian Nation.” Aria’s headline was: “Iran Roared, Khatami Smiled, ‎Reforms Receive Vote of Confidence.”‎

But what did the reformists do with all that trust and support? ‎

Two days before the heart-wrenching assassination attempt on his life, the ideologue of ‎the reform movement, Saeed Hajjarian said at Isfahan University that everything is now ‎ready for reforms. Until now we told the people the Majlis is derailing reforms, now we ‎have taken over the Majlis [paraphrased]. Two days later, Hajjarian’s assassination ‎became a symbol of the will to resist reforms. Today everyone knows the fate of the ‎press law reform. Not a single reform legislation was successful: not the press bill, not ‎the political parties bill, not the political crimes bill, not the anti-torture bill, etc‎

None of the promises made by reformist candidates to further the project of ‎democratization in Iran bore fruit. Why not? A majority of reformists cite the ‎determined resistance of main centers of power and supervisory institutions as the main ‎hindrance to reforms. Very well. Several years have now passed since then and a fresh ‎round of elections are approaching. What has changed since then? How do reformists ‎propose to realize their promises this time? Has something new happened to entice ‎centers of power to limit their influence even within the confines laid down by the current ‎Consitution? Have supervisory institutions agreed to relinquish their priviledged role? If ‎not, then how are reformist policies to be implemented? How are social and political ‎freedoms to be institutionalized? ‎

The central question still remains: Are democratic reforms toward institutionalization of ‎self-determination and human rights possible within the current legal and operational ‎framework? If yes, how? If not, then what is it that reformists want to reform? Would it ‎not be better for reformists to honestly accept – that is, if they are allowed to – that, at ‎best, they will play the role of a moderate faction in the Islamic Republic? If there are no ‎convincing answers to these questions, one can conclude that “moderation” is now ‎finding its definition between the sentences of the “coalition”: abandonment of the reform ‎project and transition to the role of moderate faction. ‎