Following the mass disqualification of reformist candidates registered for the eight Majlis ‎elections to be held on March 14, 2008, three prominent moderate leaders Khatami, ‎Karoubi and Hashemi discussed in a joint meeting strategies to alleviate the situation. ‎Meanwhile, several reformist parties (from the reformist coalition) released statements ‎harshly criticizing the disqualification process and condemning the upcoming elections as ‎unfair and illegitimate. ‎

It is apparent that the various reformist groups are trying to carve out a little competitive ‎breathing space through intense lobbying. The threat of boycotting the election is seen in ‎the respect as a last-ditch effort to combat current conditions. Meanwhile, the hardliners ‎know very well that they are in a position of power and can dictate the result of the ‎‎“game” however they prefer. ‎

They believe that reformists will participate in the election regardless, and therefore are ‎not willing to compromise over the disqualification of reformist candidates. In their ‎view, even in the worst-case possible scenario, if certain groups within the reformist ‎camp choose not to participate in the elections, they can do no more than to publish a ‎statement. Without a doubt, the hardliners would not face mass protest, civil unrest, or ‎organized efforts of civil disobedience by the public. ‎

It seems that, in response to the lobbying efforts of the reformists, the hardliners will ‎eventually qualify certain prominent reformists. Also, it is highly probable that with ‎continuation of the lobbying, several other lesser known and ineffective reformists will ‎qualify and be allowed to compete with hardliner candidates. ‎

What we are witnessing in these last days are efforts by reformists to force a small ‎concession on the hardliners, an event that will not only not diminish the power of ‎hardliners or alter the composition of the eight Majlis, but will actually remind the ‎reformists that, in order to continue their quest for political survival, they must negotiate ‎with those in power – whom they criticize – more than before. ‎

It is obvious that such a strategy cannot be a suitable one for confronting the hardliner ‎block. The issue of what role, if any, the pro-democracy movement in Iran and its ‎reliance on civil society activism plays in the future strategy of reformists vying for ‎power is an issue that needs further clarification. ‎

In the end, if reformists continue to lobby for more candidates without paying attention to ‎the true needs and demands of the social base that supports reforms, they may end up in a ‎harder position than if they fail to win seats in the eight Majlis: they may alienate their ‎social base. ‎