If we look at current developments as outside observers, we may say that a situation like ‎that of year 1360 [1981-1982] is appearing. ‎

In year 1360 an antagonistic opposition emerged between the Mojahedin-e Khalq ‎Organization and Hezbollah, which did not leave any space for forces in the middle.‎

On the one hand, Mojahedin-e Khalq announced armed resistance and embarked on a ‎widespread and brutal terror campaign, while on the other, Hezbollah reverted to using ‎bloody violence to eliminate the opposition. ‎

There were many people from different schools of thought in the middle that approved ‎neither of Mojahedin’s terror nor of Hezbollah’s brutality, but were forced to pick a side ‎that was not to their complete liking. ‎

A portion of moderate forces sided with the Mojahedin and paid for their choice by ‎suffering imprisonment or death. Another portion joined Hezbollah and not only closed ‎their eyes on the group’s unnecessary use of violence, but in fact had to endorse it. ‎

The majority of the moderates, however, found it impossible to pick a reasonable position ‎and voluntarily chose silence while waiting for better and more reasonable times. ‎

A new antagonism has now emerged between the Islamic Republic and the United States. ‎

In this new polar game, moderate forces that support neither the Islamic Republic’s ‎internal or foreign policy nor the foreigner’s intrusion into the affairs of their country face ‎the choice of year 1360. ‎

Some of them will perhaps be pulled toward the United States, thinking that there is no ‎other way. ‎

Some will support the Islamic Republic with the idea that it is better to support one’s own ‎government, whatever it may be, over a foreign one. ‎

The majority of forces in the middle, however, will try to warn about consequences of ‎conflict while criticizing both sides of the argument. ‎

In this situation, the equation can change only if moderate forces inside the country are ‎confident and powerful enough to enter the scene as a third player and change it. ‎

The problem is that the moderates satisfy neither of these conditions, and if they insist on ‎their point of view, they will be sacrificed in a situation that they did not help bring about ‎nor benefit from. ‎

The remarks of Rahim Safavi, former commander of Revolutionary Guards at Sharif ‎University show that Iranian military officers are taking threats of war very seriously and ‎warn about the indifference of politicians.‎

From the interview of Ali Fallahian, former minister of intelligence, with the Fars News ‎Agency, one can conclude that even among forces that are famous for extremism, the ‎nuclear issue is not a life or death issue and can be compromised on. ‎

Though difficult, it is not impossible for a moderate force to emerge out of Iran’s political ‎structure and create a consensus among the ruling elite to prevent war. ‎

In my opinion, the old style of activism on the part of moderate forces may make it much ‎harder for pragmatic forces to emerge from within the system. ‎

Pragmatic forces in the government have their own logic and language, and cannot be ‎publicly supported by moderate forces in the middle, and may even be hurt by them. ‎

Therefore, those who are wary of war must refrain from acting in a way that limits the ‎possibility for emergence of pragmatic forces. Hopefully, an escape route will emerge in ‎these strange times. ‎