According to various news reports, Tehran’s Revolutionary Court has found three Polytechnic University students guilty of publishing ‘anti-Islamic’ material. The conviction comes only a week after the head of the judiciary Ayatollah Shahroudi, ordered the court to begin preparations for the release of the students, and only days after Tehran’s Prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, publicly defied the head of judiciary’s orders by sending the students back to solitary confinement, threatening their families and prohibiting them from meeting with any ‘officials’.

Saeed Mortazavi showed a similar kind of defiance in violating a court order allowing the suspended Ham-Mihan daily to continue operations. Hours after a court ruling lifted the ban on Ham-Mihan, Mortazavi openly defied the court order by shutting down the reformist daily. Ham-Mihan was published briefly two months ago after serving a seven-year ban, but was suspended on Mortazavi’s direct orders.

Meanwhile, newspapers close to the Ahmadinejad Administration began blasting the head of the judiciary last week for his criticism of the president’s sudden decision to remove two cabinet ministers from their posts. ‘Iran’ daily, which is the administration’s official mouthpiece, dedicated its leading story, first-page editorial, main report and a column to criticizing Ayatollah Shahroudi, accusing him of undermining the principles of republicanism. The daily also warned Ayatollah Shahroudi that a comprehensive investigation of the judiciary system during his tenure may be may be carried out.

The reality is that, in the past few weeks and months, numerous reports have surfaced in the country’s press covering attacks on the head of the judiciary and his position. One case, which was covered extensively, dealt with the stoning of a man in Takistan, where a hardliner judge defied the head of judiciary’s order prohibiting all judges from passing stoning sentences. Other cases were covered less extensively. One example is the case of bloggers’ court which accuses them on the basis of their forced confessions, despite the head of judiciary’s clear announcement that such ‘confessions’ cannot be admitted as evidence. More importantly, in the past few months, lower courts have defied even simple orders from the head of judiciary. One case that comes to mind is that of the imprisoned journalist, Ali Farahbakhsh, who was kept in prison during the Persian New Year’s holidays, despite Ayatollah Shahroudi’s order to release him temporary for the holidays.

Such happenings have become something of a norm recently, so much so that they no longer attract the attention of the press. It seems as if, not just the press and the country’s officials, but Ayatollah Shahroudi himself has realized the unavoidable fact that he has not significant authority in the organization under his supposed control.

The struggle for power within the judiciary reflects the more general struggle for power that has afflicted a major part of Iran’s government. It is still too soon to conclude that the emerging hardliner movement – the Iranian “neocon” movement – will prevail in the long-run over the traditional conservative establishment. For the time being, however, at least (probably until Ahmadinejad’s administration remains in power, or until the Supreme Leader realizes that the current administration threatens regime’s survival), the outcome of the power struggle in Iran points to the victory of the Iranian neocons over the conservative establishment.

In reality, when students at the Polytechnic University, in the presence of Ahmadinejad, whom they regard as the symbol of the Iranian neocon movement, shouted “Down with the Dictator,” and the President replied, “We will crucify those who are pretending to be students,” it was clear that Polytechnic University student activists had to await the harsh revenge by the neocons who control the country’s intelligence and security apparatus. That is why Tehran’s Prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi, who is ignoring the orders of the head of judiciary, told the families of detained students that their sons “will not be released until they write apologies.” And that is why Ham-mihan daily, a newspaper which is regarded by the administration as having supported Mr. Ahamdinejad’s main opponent in the 2005 presidential election, is shut down again after having already served two suspension sentences – this time on direct orders of Saeed Mortazavi, in an obvious display of power.

Under these circumstances, it is wise for the press inside and outside Iran not to have any qualms, until further notice, as to which group or faction within the Iranian government has the upper hand. Such doubts come across easily in the reporting of many publications, particularly those outside Iran.

Some publications continue such writings despite past events. For example, when someone like Hashemi Rafsanjani speaks about a dialogue with the United States, they suddenly write about Iran’s ‘shift in policy’ and ignore hardline Kayhan daily’s first-page editorial that tells Hashemi Rafsanjani that he is not in a position to cross the regime’s red line… or when the head of Iran’s National Security Council speaks about the possibility of negotiating over enrichment suspension, before Ahmadinejad administration spokespeople deny the claim, such publications write in hurried articles about Iran’s ‘new approach’ to the nuclear case.