Recently some critics of the Iranian government such as Mehdi Karubi – President Ahmadinejad’s rival during the first phase of the presidential race of 2005 – have presented arguments that the country’s parliamentary elections in four months will take place in a less restrictive atmosphere. Based on this, some of the leading figures have begun consultations with members of the ruling circles to convince them to approve the qualifications of reformist candidates.

Apparently, the only reason this view has gained prominence among some political activists is that because of “sensitive conditions of the country” the ruling hardliners may be more flexible in approving the candidates for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Among the signs that some analysts point out for this “sensitive conditions”, the nuclear issue is considered the most important.

But any group that bases its upcoming political activity on the argument that the international pressures on the conservatists ruling Iran would lead to softer domestic policies by the officials should consider this: How exactly may international pressures cause an opening of the elections atmosphere? Or let’s look at the issue from a different perspective: How will easing the qualifications of rival candidates for parliamentary elections may lead to diminishing international pressure on Tehran?

The answer to this question primarily depends on what is our understanding of the nature of the international pressure on Tehran under the current circumstances. The specific areas where Tehran must show flexibility to resolve its issues with the international community are clear to world powers as well as to the Iranian government. Numerous statements published in the conservative press in Iran demonstrate that those officials that understand the seriousness of the international pressure on Tehran believe that if Iran concedes appropriately to the West on strategic issues, such as nuclear enrichment or Iran’s interference in the region, nobody will seriously raise any questions about the elections process in the country. Conversely, if Tehran does not solve its strategic issues with the international community, the West will continue focusing its pressures on Iran to resolve these issues with Iran.

In fact, decision makers in the Islamic Republic believe that even if international pressure becomes unbearable, they still do not have to hold free elections or even “less restricted” ones. Therefore those individuals and groups that feel the regime will be forced, at least in the short term, to hold free elections because of international pressure should be aware that current Iranian rulers do not share this view at all.

One of the important damages of the reformist movement in the past has been the illusionary optimism, and absence of a relationship between their promises and actual potential. Both the officials of the ministry of the interior of the reform administration who had threatened to stop the elections to the seventh Majlis unless the elections were truly competitive (and retreated the day after a warning by the leader of Iran), and even Mr. Karubi who during the last presidential elections had threatened to expose the rigging of the elections (and kept his silence after ayatollah Khamenei’s warning) are equally responsible for erroneously estimating their strength in relation to the political system of the country.

Now again, Mr. Karubi has overestimated his negotiating power vis-à-vis the conservatives and is once again creating unrealistic optimism, as he and other reformist had done in the past. But do politicians like Mr. Karubi who have personal hands-on two-decades of experience in Iran honestly believe that elections politics in the Islamic Republic may be changed through talks of this kind?