Iran witnessed numerous judicial and security events over the past few weeks each of which made headlines and their totality conveyed a meaningful message.

The resumption of the practice of stoning, after a lull of a few years, the execution of 16 individuals and the immediate announcement of 17 more on the death row, the shocking announcement of flogging of women activists, the publication of torture exercised against student prisoners (and the indifference of judicial and security authorities to even attempt to cover up or hide the torture evidence), gross violence exercised against “social criminals” in front of cameras, etc., are the events that took place in a short period of span and deserve reflection.

What is going on? Should one accept the explanation that, for example, a judge had personally ignored the moratorium on stoning that was decreed by the head of the judiciary in implementing the stoning sentence, or that the rise in unprecedented brutality exercised by law enforcement and security forces has taken place without coordination from the chain of command? Is the event as simple as that agents unilaterally exercised unnecessary use of force in the performance of their duties without the consent of their superiors?

One can be partially optimistic and believe that these violent measures were the products of unilateral decisions and acts implemented by mid-level security and judicial authorities. But when these events become newsworthy in their totality in Iran, not much room for optimism is left.

In reality, even if one had the minimum amount of pessimism in looking at events in Iran, there is no alternative but to accept the assumption that security and judicial authorities supporting the recent brutalities have become at least partially certain that their (domestic and internationally) newsy violent acts will not be opposed by more senior authorities of the state. Whether it is the judge in Takistan who despite the public reminders by many officials about the decree that suspended public stonings goes ahead and implements the stoning sentence, or the police officer who in bright daylight and in the middle of a major square in Tehran bloodies the face of a women because of “Islamic dress”, they all must feel secure that there would be no consequences in demonstrating this level of brutality. Otherwise, had they suspected that their actions would face reprimands from their chain of command or organizational superiors, it is logically unlikely that they would so blatantly and unilaterally engage in such levels of unprecedented violence.

In view of this reality, it appears that a powerful force inside the state has come to the conclusion that conditions in the country are in such a serious critical state that there are no reservations in controlling the domestic situation in a hardline manner (following the recent political, social and security events) or to stop this priority because of considerations for mass media or international organizations.

It would certainly be inaccurate to claim that every judge, commander or agent who pursued such excessive use of force during the recent weeks was directly following the above logic. Still, one must remember that there are forces inside the Iranian security and judicial agencies that have a huge potential for exercising violent and unchecked brutality, as the recent history attests. These forces typically view the considerations that certain “weak” politicians have for domestic and international issues as barriers in their efforts to mainstream social conditions, and believe that their views are easily modified through the creation of the atmosphere of fear. Even if these groups are not expressly encouraged by the centers of power to show severity and ruthlessness, they certainly have a sharp ear for recognizing “consent” or at the least “indifference” from these centers regarding expressing and expanding the use of excessive force.

Should the senior centers of power in Iran provide - in whatever manner - the green light to those groups in the country that have the potential to execute brutal and violent measures, these groups have no constraints in exercising any excessive means. This approach is perhaps the source of the new wave of confrontations that is taking shape in the political-social-security scene of Iran. And there are absolutely no guarantees that these confrontations will not go beyond their current levels of brutality.